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Feasibility Assessment Framework for Financing Public-Private Partnership 
Infrastructure Projects through Asset-Backed Security 
Zheng Lu 
In modern days, along with restricted traditional funding sources and massive 
demand of infrastructure investment comes a significant gap of funding. Institutional 
investors are considered reliable sources of financing for infrastructure due to the 
long-term investment horizon and asset/liability management (ALM) requirement. 
Hence, institutional investors start to embrace infrastructure as an attractive asset class 
because infrastructure assets are able to generate long-term, stable, and predictable 
cash flows and diversify investors’ portfolios.  
As a result, financial innovations to encourage institutional investment have 
become an important issue. Asset-backed securitization (ABS) of Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) infrastructure project’s receivables has been promoted in China 
since Dec. 2016 as an alternative financing instrument to encourage institutional 
investment to finance infrastructure projects. Traditional approaches of project 
financing are considered less attractive vis-à-vis the innovative PPPABS financing 
method, in terms of liquidity, steady operational asset, risk sharing, bankruptcy 
remoteness, long maturity, and standardization. Despite these advantages, lack of 
knowledge and experience is still preventing project participants from seeking finance 
opportunities with PPPABS. 
  
In order to provide a guideline for practitioners to understand this innovative 
financing method, this thesis proposes a feasibility assessment framework for 
financing PPP infrastructure projects through ABS. Firstly, a list of 25 critical success 
factors (CSFs) of PPPABS is identified through a literature analysis, case studies, and 
expert interviews. Then a questionnaire survey is designed to collect opinions on 
these 25 critical factors from not only PPP stakeholders but also capital markets. 
Preliminary analysis is performed then to have a basic understanding of the data, 
including descriptive analysis, agreement analysis, and analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Furthermore, after applying factor analysis to reduce the dimensions of the model, 5 
principal components are derived, including “Effective ABS issuance and lifetime 
management”, “Clear regulatory guidance”, “Robust PPP and concessional 
arrangements”, “Supportive capital market conditions”, and “Reliable underlying 
asset quality”. Based on this finding, an assessment framework and index are 
proposed for PPPABS financing. Afterward, a case study of the pilot batch of 
PPPABS in China is presented as validation of the framework.  
By investigating the causal relationships among the critical factors of successful 
PPPABS financing, an advanced model is constructed to assist the project participants 
to quantify the feasibility. A focus group is conducted to collect rating data from 
experienced experts who have participated infrastructure ABS issuance and 
management intensively. Structural equation modeling (SEM) method is used to 
analyze the rating data of PPPABS products on the market. Hypothetical models are 
  
then examined, and the best-fit model for illustration is verified and proposed. Causal 
relationships in this model are investigated and proved to be significant. The result 
indicates that, “Capital market conditions”, “Underlying asset quality”, and 
“Regulatory guidance” are exogenous variables and affect the overall feasibility of 
PPPABS indirectly. Furthermore, both “ABS issuance and lifetime management” and 
“PPP and concessional arrangements” are endogenous variables, affecting the overall 
feasibility directly.  
The path coefficients are employed to calculate the weights allocated to each 
principal factor and to create the feasibility assessment index. At the end, the pilot 
batch of PPPABS launched in China is used again to illustrate the application in 
practice and validation of the advanced assessment model. As an in-depth work to 
understand critical pricing determinants of PPPABS, a regression analysis is 
performed to build a financing cost estimation model for practitioners. 
This work can serve as a fundamental guideline in this particular research area of 
ABS financing for infrastructure projects. And the proposed framework shall support 
the decision-making process for not only the project managers who consider financing 
through ABS, but also the institutional investors who consider investment 
opportunities in PPPABS products.  
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1 CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Substantial rehabilitation and construction of infrastructure are in demand 
globally, while sources of financing are still inadequate (Estache 2010; Helm 2010). 
The annual global infrastructure investment gap is estimated to be around USD 1.3 
trillion (Bhattacharya et al. 2012; World Bank 2013). Most of the funding comes from 
the public sector, but the public sector is continuously under strain, especially after the 
2008 financial crisis (Schwartz et al. 2014; Stewart and Yermo 2012). Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) has been widely studied and applied across the globe to achieve 
Value for Money (VFM) and to enhance the efficiency of infrastructure management 
(Ke et al. 2009; Tang et al. 2010). However, the private capital mobilized within 
Public-Private Partnerships is mainly limited to sponsors and financiers who already 
have expertise and experience in infrastructure investment (Inframation 2017; Regan 
et al. 2013). In addition, since the debt financing of infrastructure projects still relies 
heavily on financiers such as commercial banks, new regulations such as Basel III 
further constrain the liquidity (Angelini et al. 2015; Dias Jr and Ioannou 1995). 
While public and conventional resources are continuously under strain, 
innovative financing methods are needed to encourage additional funding sources to 
relieve the global funding gap problem of infrastructure. Fortunately, potential sources 
of financing can be found from the institutional investors, e.g., pension funds and 
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insurance companies. The institutional investments can help free up initial equity/debt 
investors for new infrastructure projects, which results in an asset recycling effect. 
More importantly, for risk management and liquidity concerns, infrastructure assets 
with long time horizon by nature are suitable for matching long-term liabilities of 
institutional investors, such as insurance claims and pension annuities (Della Croce 
and Yermo 2013; Inderst 2009; Inderst and Stewart 2014). Therefore, capital market 
solutions, e.g., innovative financing instruments, need to be explored to encourage 
institutional investment in infrastructure projects. Developed countries usually have a 
mature and efficient bond market to finance infrastructure projects. Revenue bonds 
and private activity bonds are widely used in the U.S., while covered bonds are 
popular in Europe. However, for developing countries without mature bond markets, 
more suitable solutions are needed (Inderst and Stewart 2014; Sihombing 2007).  
Asset-backed securitization serves as one of the most significant financial 
innovations in the past decades. Many have discussed applying securitization in 
infrastructure project financing to access more funding sources through capital 
markets (Bahl 2012; Grushkin and Bartfeld 2013; Ketkar and Ratha 2009). 
Securitization of PPP infrastructure project’s receivables has been promoted in China 
since 2016, as an alternative financing instrument to encourage institutional 
investment to finance infrastructure projects. According to studies of PPP, sound 
financing is critical in the lifecycle of PPP projects (Osei-Kyei and Chan 2015; Tang 
and Shen 2013). However, there are only a few studies specifically about PPPABS 
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mainly because 1. The global securitization market is tremendously restricted after the 
sub-prime crisis (Angelini et al. 2015); 2. PPPABS was just defined and promoted in 
China at the end of 2016; 3. Developed countries usually have a mature bond market 
to finance infrastructure projects with relatively low financial cost (Grushkin and 
Bartfeld 2013; Perraudin 2014).  
Although institutional investors’ appetite of infrastructure is partially fulfilled by 
bond investments, there is still room for asset-backed security as an alternative 
investment vehicle because of its unique characteristics, especially in developing 
countries (de Albornoz and Soliño 2014; Perraudin). Considering that PPPABS, if 
proved to be effective and efficient in China, could also be adopted by other countries 
and areas, many related works could be done for this financial innovation. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Research on this topic is still insufficient to guide practice. Since the concept was 
officially defined and promoted in China in 2016, there are merely 2 papers in 2015, 9 
papers in 2016 and suddenly 109 in 2017, all in Chinese, according to the China 
National Knowledge Infrastructure database (CNKI 2018). At the time of writing, 
topics in this field include general study, application in a specific sector, regulatory, 
tax, accounting, pricing, bankruptcy remoteness, risk management, and legal issues. 
To help practitioners assess the feasibility of PPPABS financing, it is crucial to 
understand perspectives from major participants in the market and what factors lead to 
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the success of such financing arrangements. A comprehensive feasibility assessment 
framework for PPPABS needs to resolve the following research questions: 
• What is the current status of infrastructure financing sources and methods? 
• What is PPPABS? 
• Is PPPABS suitable to encourage funding from capital markets? 
• What are the critical success factors for PPP projects to finance through ABS? 
• How to assess the feasibility of PPPABS financing? 
1.3 Research Framework 
Studies in the area of PPP widely apply a range of methodologies such as 
literature analysis, case study, interview and questionnaire to collect data. Statistical 
analysis, scenario analysis, and simulation are usually critical to process the data 
acquired (Ke et al. 2009). In the end, focus group, pilot study, or expert interview are 
used as validation of the study. Among the studies on CSFs of PPP, case studies and 
questionnaire surveys are mainstream methodologies adopted (Osei-Kyei and Chan 
2015). 
In this thesis, a careful literature analysis was performed to generate a 
preliminary list of CSFs of PPPABS financing. Literature from infrastructure finance, 
PPP, and ABS are reviewed as research on this new interdisciplinary topic is still 
limited. Moreover, case studies of successful PPP projects of the World Bank and 
infrastructure ABS default scenarios were carefully studied. Besides, to analyze what 
is still lacking in the CSFs list identified, expert interviews and survey were 
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conducted to further analyze and integrate opinions from both PPP and ABS 
industries. After collecting the data from a questionnaire survey, reliability of the data 
is tested. Then descriptive statistics of the CSFs are stated, and ANOVA is performed 
to compare opinions. Then factor analysis is applied to reduce the dimensions of the 
model to achieve the principal components. Based on this finding, an assessment 
framework and index were constructed for PPPABS financing. Afterward, another 
case study of the pilot batch of PPPABS launched in China is used to demonstrate the 
application of the framework and index. To find the causal relationships among the 
principal factors, structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis is adopted to analyze 
rating data from a focus group. Finally, based on the principal components and causal 
relationships, an advanced assessment model and index were constructed to serve as a 
guideline for assessing the feasibility of ABS financing for PPP infrastructure projects. 
Last but not least, multiple regression analysis is adopted to analyze the pricing data 
of PPP infrastructure ABS products. A pricing model for PPPABS financing is created. 
Figure 1 Research Framework
1.4 Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation is structured into eight chapters. Chapter two reviews the 
financing sources of infrastructure projects as well as 
infrastructure financing methods. Chapter three provides identification of critical 
success factors of PPPABS
expert interviews. Charter four presents an empirical study designed based on the 
critical success factors derived previously. It also examines the b
challenges of PPPABS, suitable PPP 
comparison among experts






 financing, through literature analysis, case studies and 







 of PPPABS 
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based on the results of Principal Component Analysis. Chapter six further examines 
the causal relationships among the principal components by performing structural 
equation modeling analysis. It also presents an advanced feasibility assessment model 
based on the analysis. Furthermore, the pilot batch of the PPPABS assessment and 
selection process is used as validation.  
Chapter seven provides an independent tool of pricing for PPPABS products. 
Multiple regression analysis is applied in this chapter to analyze the data and 
construct the pricing model. Chapter eight discusses the conclusions and the future 
work. 
  
22.1 Infrastructure Financing Sources
The global infrastructure demand is considered substantial if maintaining the 
growth rate of economy is required. However, available funding sources are estimated 
to fulfill just a portion of the demand, which left a significant gap of funding 
(Bhattacharya et al. 2012)
estimated to be $3.2 trillion per year, while only $1.
(McKinsey&Company 2016; World Bank 2013)
trillion can still be expected
Figure 2 Infrastructure Funding Gap 
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. Through 2030, the infrastructure investment need is 
9 trillion funding is available 
. Therefore, a funding gap of $1.
.  






Figure 3 General Government Net Lending/Borrowing (Percent of GDP) of 
Emerging Markets ( IMF 2017) 
Considering the limited public financing sources, public-private partnership is 
widely advocated to bring in private funding sources (Ke et al. 2010). However, the 
private capital mobilized by PPP is limited to sponsors who already have expertise 
and experience in infrastructure and financiers who are restricted by regulations such 
as Basel III after the crisis (Angelini et al. 2015). 
 



















Accordingly, institutional investors, such as issuance companies and pension 
funds, are encouraged to play more important role in infrastructure investment (Della 
Croce and Yermo 2013; Inderst and Stewart 2014). With over 70 trillion dollars total 
asset, 1% of allocation can be very helpful to bridge the massive funding gap (Inderst 
and Stewart 2014). The asset liability matching requirement of the institutional 
investors can explain their expectations (CFA Institute 2017). The aim is to match 
cash inflows from asset investment and cash outflows from liability to better manage 
the overall risk of the fund. Matching the investors’ expectations with infrastructure 
lifecycle, it can be concluded that institutional investors are suitable for debt, low risk, 
liquid, long-term, operating assets, while commercial banks are suitable for 
construction phase due to their expertise, experience, and short-term liabilities 
(Ammermann 2015). This is one of the fundamental reasons to recycle initial 
financiers with institutional investment through refinancing methods. 
 
Figure 5 Total Asset Managed by Institutional Investors in OECD Countries 
(OECD 2011) 
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Due to insufficient traditional funding sources, institutional investors are strong 
sources of financing for infrastructure (Inderst 2009; Inderst and Stewart 2014). First 
of all, with over 70 trillion dollars total asset, institutional investors’ additional 
allocation can significantly contribute to resolving the funding dilemma of 
infrastructure (Inderst and Stewart 2014). Moreover, institutional investment, as a new 
financing source, will replace part of the initial investment of the infrastructure 
project. Accordingly, money will be released back to initial investors and financiers 
who can then invest in new infrastructure projects afterward. For that reason, in terms 
of bridging the global infrastructure funding gap, the actual contribution by 
incorporating institutional investment will be magnified because of this recycling 
process. Last but not least, compared with traditional financiers (commercial banks), 
insurance companies and pension funds are more suitable for long-term infrastructure 
investment due to their asset liability matching requirement (CFA Institute 2017; 
Della Croce and Yermo 2013; Lam et al. 2011; Stewart and Yermo 2012). For instance, 
Canada is well-known for the direct pension investment in infrastructure assets, while 
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matching duration of assets and 
liabilities) but can be less strict about 
using ALM with any surplus. May 
have legal restrictions on asset classes 






Match assets and liabilities for each 
sub-portfolio based on shared risk 





Banks have strictest need to meet 
liabilities so they use a pure ALM 
framework with the goal of earning a 






Have to meet all funding requirements 
via earnings. Long time horizon and 
low spending requirements increase 
risk tolerance. Preserve assets while 
meeting spending requirements, 
risk/return usually determined via a 
spending rule. Level of spending, 
importance to budget of supported 
institution, and whether there are 
ongoing donations impact ability to 
take risk. 
Source: CFA Institute (2017) 
Coincidently, institutional investors themselves have started to look at 
infrastructure as an attractive asset class in recent years (Della Croce 2012; Inderst 
2017). As shown in Figure 6, many large-size infrastructure investment funds have 
been raised. All of these new funds raised by Blackstone, Macquarie, and 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) show investors’ growing appetite for 
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infrastructure (Preqin 2017). The underlying reasons are: 1. The long-term horizon of 
institutional investors matches with the long-term infrastructure investment, so that 
the duration of investors’ assets matches with the duration of investors’ liabilities; 2. 
Predictable and stable cash flows generated by the infrastructure investment are 
favored by institutional investors due to their cash flow withdrawal requirement; 3. 
Infrastructure assets have a relatively low correlation with traditional investment asset 
classes, such as corporate equity and bond, which gives diversification to the portfolio 
of institutional investors; 4. Some infrastructure assets are able to hedge against 
inflation in the portfolio (Ammermann 2015; CFA Institute 2016; CFA Institute 2017; 
Sawant 2010). 
 























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017E
Aggregate capital raised ($Bn) Cumulative capital raised since 2010($Bn)
No. of closed funds
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2.2 Convetional Infrastructure Financing Methods 
To fund more infrastructure projects, financial vehicles that can attract 
institutional investors are needed. Table 2 lists common financing instruments and 
investment vehicles that investors can use to get exposure to infrastructure. 
Table 2 Infrastructure Finance Instruments and Investment Vehicles 
Modes Infrastructure Finance Instruments Market Vehicles 
Asset 
Category 









































































Source: (OECD 2015) 
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2.2.1 Perspective of Institutional Investors 
With so many investment vehicles available, allocation on infrastructure assets 
by institutional investors has still been limited, only 1% of total asset under 
management of pension funds (Inderst 2013). A flat allocation of 1% results in USD 
0.7 trillion to infrastructure investments. An increase to 3% would imply an allocation 
of about USD 2.1 trillion, which can definitely help bridge the funding gap (Stewart 
and Yermo 2012). A significant area to look into is how to access and encourage this 
funding.  
Further investigation was carried out to determine why infrastructure investment 
vehicles appear less attractive to institutional investors. Private sector investors are 
always interested in participating in stable, predictable and profitable investment 
opportunities. A survey conducted by OECD research team points out barriers for 
institutional investors to investment in infrastructure market (Della Croce and Yermo 
2013). These barriers include: lack of liquidity; transparency; and political 
commitment over the long term. There are also hurdles from the investor’s side, for 
example, lacking of expertise in infrastructure, problem of scale of funds, short-
termism of investors. 
2.2.2 Existing Infrastructure Financing Approaches 
Infrastructure investments in nature are attractive to institutional investors, for 
example pension funds, as infrastructure projects are long-term investments that can 
match the long-term pension liabilities. Moreover, infrastructure investments can 
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produce predictable and stable cash flows in a very long period of time. In addition, 
infrastructure assets could hedge pension funds’ sensitivity to inflation. Finally, 
because of the low correlation of infrastructure with traditional asset classes, pension 
funds are increasingly looking at infrastructure to diversify their portfolios. Nowadays, 
there are various financing instruments and investment vehicles available for them to 
get exposure to infrastructure investment (Table 2). 
Primary vs. secondary market: primary market is for financing initiation of an 
infrastructure project, including procurement, construction, and delivery. It can also be 
described as a greenfield project in public private partnership. Secondary market 
refers to the operation phase of an infrastructure project, or a brownfield project in 
public private partnership. Typically, the primary market is more risky along with 
higher potential return. It also needs a heavy initial investment from the investors. 
Investors who are interested in primary market usually concern about the potential of 
growth, while the secondary market investors are focusing on stable cash flows from 
infrastructure operation service. 
Equity vs. debt finance: like companies, infrastructure projects are also financed 
through a combination of equity and debt, usually with high leverage. Investors can 
get exposure by buying either stocks of a listed infrastructure company or bonds 
offered by such companies. In addition, traditional project finance loans also belong to 
debt financing. 
Public vs. private companies: infrastructure companies can also be categorized 
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by public-traded (listed on the stock market) and private-traded (unlisted). Public-
traded companies are more transparent and liquid than private companies, while 
private companies typically have less correlation with other assets and thus provide 
better diversification for investors. In addition, listing requires more information 
disclosure compare to unlisted vehicles. 
Direct vs. indirect investment: direct investment refers to direct holding of target-
company’s equity or debt, while indirect investment can be achieved via other 
infrastructure specialist funds. For example, investors can invest in such exchange-
traded funds (ETFs) that bundle the shares of these companies together by sector or 
region. There are also dedicated infrastructure funds, with first one set up in the mid 
1990s in Australia. For public companies, equity can be easily acquired on the stock 
exchange. But for private companies, it takes effort to find financing opportunities. 
2.3 Social Impact Project Finance1 
The purpose of this section is to propose an innovation in infrastructure finance, 
particularly a framework of Social Impact Project Finance (SIPF) proposed by the 
author in a previous paper (Lu et al. 2015). It is designed for financing infrastructure 
projects where public sector commits to pay performance-based yield for improved 
services, which in turn motivate private investor to better construct and manage 
infrastructure assets. And why SIPF may help addressing global infrastructure 
                                                 
1 This section refers to a paper co-authored with FenioskyPeña-Mora, Xiaodong Robert Wang, Charles Q. 
Shen, and ZainabRiaz. It was published in the Procedia Engineering of Creative Construction Conference 2015.  
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financing gap will also be explained. SIPF will be defined with illustration, and the 
framework of SIPF will be structured and proposed as a partial solution to the massive 
infrastructure deficit. 
Before introducing SIPF, Social Impact Bond (SIB) is examined. It provides the 
inspiration to design a performance-based impact financing method for infrastructure 
projects. According to Social Finance’s definition, social impact bond, also known as 
pay-for-success financing, is a contract with the public sector in which it commits to 
pay for improved social outcomes (Barclay and Symons 2013). In other words, it is a 
performance-based financial arrangement that encourages private funding for social 
programs, with funds raised from investors to provide social service providers with 
the working capital to deliver their services. First, a public sector problem is identified. 
Then government finds investors who are interested in such social project. Investors 
provide capital to SIB intermediary, which is also known as a special purpose 
company. SIB intermediary then provides working capital to NGOs or companies to 
implement the program. In this way, NGOs/companies have the money to implement 
social programs, which might not happen without such arrangement. At last, after 
independent evaluation is conducted, government pays principle and interest to 
investors only if expected impact achieved by the program.  
Figure 7 Mechanism of Social
Some key characteristics
infrastructure financing innovation
introducing private investor from capital market
charge of funding a program’s delivery and operations. Third, public sector commits 
to paying the investor only if the program achieves better social outcomes, and 
government can enjoy cost savings from improved outcomes. Last but not least, it can 
be flexible enough to be designed to be very profitable to attract private investors. SIB 
clearly shows a way to encourage private funding for social good. 
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 Impact Bond 
 of SIB arrangement are suitable to be embedded in the
. First, it taps into new funding opportunities by 






financing framework with both liquidity and potential profitability can be created by 
combining the idea of SIB, PPP, as well as securitization. 
SIPF is defined as a financing method of infrastructure projects by which public 
sector makes commitment to pay additional yield for improved infrastructure services, 
or other social impacts, which in turn motivates the private sector to better design, 
construct, operate, and maintain infrastructure assets. 
The framework of SIPF is shown in figure 8. First, when an infrastructure project 
is needed, the government or public authority sets up an SPV and signs concession to 
authorize the project exclusive to the company. Second, investment banks come in to 
help the company offering SIPFs to investors, signing contracts among multiple-
parties. The contracts specify impact factors of target infrastructure project and the 
benchmarks required by the public sector. The SPV raises fund and starts to 
build/manage the infrastructure, reaching out the contractors. In the mean time, it still 
can borrow money from banks as usual if needed. Another thing needs to be 
highlighted here is that the investors of SIPFs are responsible for making strategy of 
the project company and choosing the board of the project company. Thus, the 
investors can act like equity-holders to influence the SPV to achieve impact 
requirement. The key of this mechanism is to separate interests into two parts, basic 
yield and impact yield, to emphasize the social impact of infrastructure, and to 
correlate the social impact with impact yield. Basic yield can be fixed or floating 
above any benchmark interest rates, for example London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR). Moreover, the algorithm of impact yield should be specified in the contract 
case by case. 
Figure 8 Mechanism of Social 
As an example, the project is a toll road operation and maintenance, and the 
impact factor is simply satisfaction rate of the user. If the project company manages to 
provide better service to the user, the government will get a satisfied feedback from 
the users. Then the investors will not only receive the basic interests (a fixed rate of 2% 
for example) but also the impact yield (5% at most for example). The potential high 
capital return of impact yield and secured basic return of basic yield will urge the
investors to provide better infrastructure service and social outcomes, working as an 
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endogenous incentive mechanism. Moreover, multiple impact factors can be 
implemented in the contracts to make it more practical for large-scale infrastructure 
projects. 
Ideally, SIPF is a multiple-win solution: Public sector can be satisfied because all 
components of sustainable infrastructure projects, including acceptable social, 
economic, and environmental impacts, can be embedded as impact factors in the 
framework. Moreover, SIPF can not only improve public service by taking advantage 
of private sector’s effectiveness, but also fund infrastructure projects globally via 
capital markets. In the mean time, private investors will have an easily tradable 
investment tool with attractive returns, diversification effect, and low default risks. It 
also offers them an opportunity to make a positive impact to the society as well as tax 
benefits along with impact investment. Most importantly, one of the major issues in 
PPP is the alignment of public private perspectives. The endogenous mechanism in 
SIPF can help aligning perspectives of both public and private sectors, by linking the 
impact factors to impact yield, and bring virtuous cycle to the relationship. The users 
can also enjoy better infrastructure service because of the higher efficiency of private 
sector. Moreover, due to the performance-based mechanism, taxpayers do not need to 
pay if the impact requirements are not achieved. In other words, they only pay for 
success.  
The next step is to check whether this new vehicle is attractive to institutional 
investors, especially pension funds. The main expectation of investors is for stable, 
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predictable, and profitable investments, which can be satisfied by the combination of 
stable basic yield and profitable impact yield. Impact investment can also provide 
investors tax benefits and, of course, social impact to society. Moreover, income-
producing infrastructure asset itself usually offers useful characteristics, including 
long-term, predictable income streams, low correlations to other asset classes, 
relatively lower default risk. Finally, securitization can also help our new approach to 
have a liquid and transparent market, compared to the traditional project finance 
market. 
Table 3 Merits of Social Impact Project Finance for Participants 
Stakeholder Perspective Merits of SIPF 
Investor 
• Low default risk 
• Liquidity 
• Profitability 
• Government sponsor 
• Easily tradable in the secondary market 








• Improve public service by taking 
advantage of private sector’s 
effectiveness 
• Add special impact factors, such as 
minority employment 
• Leverage by paying interests only for a 





• Receive better infrastructure service 
• Taxpayers do not pay for inefficiency 
Source: (Ammermann 2015; Sahely et al. 2005) 
Numerous studies have been conducted on involve institutional investors to 
finance infrastructure projects, but very few provide specific ideas of innovative 
financing methods. This part presents a framework of social impact project finance 
that could be a solution for infrastructure funding problem. It shows the potential of 
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funding as an innovative framework that can be very attractive to investors in the 
traditional capital market.  
By embedding social impact factors and yield, it has an endogenous incentive 
mechanism that can align perspectives of public and private sectors. It may also play a 
critical role in achieving sustainable infrastructure, because all three components of 
sustainable infrastructure (social, environmental and economic) can be easily 
embedded as impact factors in the framework. There are absolutely some key 
challenges in practice, including risk allocation among different parties, potential 
conflicts and resolution among participants, valuation/pricing of the financial product, 
etc. It is crucial to look at these challenges and try to answer them in the future 
research.  
2.4 PPPABS 
A key innovation in infrastructure finance that this thesis is focusing on is 
PPPABS. As one of the most important financial innovations in decades, 
securitization may play a critical role in infrastructure project finance. Collateralized 
loan obligation (CLO) with project loans as the underlying asset, emerged along with 
the prosperous development of securitization (Grushkin and Bartfeld 2013). However, 
this niche market was set aside after the subprime crisis. The crisis encouraged a vast 
amount of research on securitization (Acharya and Schnabl 2010; Brunnermeier 2009; 
Coval et al. 2009; Segoviano Basurto et al. 2013). After thoroughly understanding the 
merits and drawbacks of securitization, a well-designed ABS product can help isolate 
and pack risks so that institutional investors can take manageable types and amounts 
of risk to achieve capital return
In practice, there is a growing interest in applying securitization of projects’ 
future receivables as an 
projects in China. So as 
institutional investment, PPPABS
policy level in China as a bond
project’s future receivables, inclu
financing instrument immediately hits the sweet spot of domestic policy and market 
by combining the charm of 
Figure 9 Mechanism of PPPABS
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 (Panayiotou and Medda 2014). 
alternative financing/refinancing method to infrastructure 
to enrich the investment vehicle line and encourage more 
 has won the encouragement and support at the 
-like financial security backed by PPP infrastructure 
ding user fees and government subsidy.
PPP and ABS.  
 
 Such a new 
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Authorities such as the National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC), 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), Ministry Of Finance (MOF), 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC), and Stock Exchanges have been actively promoting 
PPPABS since Dec 2016 (Ministry of Finance et al. 2017; National Development and 
Reform Committee and Securities Regulatory Commission 2016). PPPABS has been 
emphasized as a critical financing method in future practices to expand financing 
channels, tap private funds, and provide secondary market liquidity to PPP investment.  
Specifically, NDRC and CSRC jointly issued “The Notice on Tasks Relating to 
the Promotion of Asset Securitization for PPP Projects in the Traditional 
Infrastructure Sector” (Document No. 2698). It officially promote PPPABS at 
national level, set basic criteria for underlying assets required for PPPABS, and call 
for 1-3 pilot projects from each provinces ( receive 41 projects by Feb. 2017). Besides, 
MOF, PBOC, and CSRC jointly issued “The Notice on promotion and regulation of 
Asset Securitization for PPP Projects” (Document No. 55), which focuses on 
securitization of PPP projects backed by local government with high credit level.  
Consequently, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange, Asset 
management association of China, and National Association of Financial Market 
Institutional Investors open green channels for PPP asset securitization and specify 
the principle of “rapid review upon filing, and enhancement of efficiency” for the PPP 
asset securitization filing stage. Furthermore, the State Council issued “The Notice on 
further stimulating private investment and promoting sustainable development” 
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(Document No. 79), which specified that “Improve the financing ability of private 
cooperation, effectively reduce financing costs and promote the securitization of PPP 
projects”. 
Table 4 PPPABS Products 










Shou Chuang Ongoing Sewage Government Shanghai 3/13/2017 84 
Qing Chun Ongoing Tunnel User Shanghai 3/13/2017 184 
Lv Yuan Ongoing Sewage Government Shenzhen 3/15/2017 51 
Jiu Tong Ongoing Heat User Shanghai 3/15/2017 112 
Dong Huan Ongoing Toll road User Shanghai 8/1/2017 242 
Xing Fu Gu An Ongoing Municipal Government NAFMII 8/11/2017 32 
Feng Xi Ongoing Pipe User Shanghai 9/5/2017 16 
Yi Zheng Xue Yuan Ongoing Logistic Government Shanghai 11/28/2017 60 
Chuan Tou Ongoing Parking User Shenzhen 12/29/2017 40 
Hua Xia Xing Fu Ongoing Municipal Government Shanghai 12/29/2017 32 
Hai Wan Issuing N/A N/A Shenzhen N/A 251 
Sang De Issuing N/A N/A Shanghai N/A 94 
Tang Shan Shi Yuan Issuing N/A N/A NAFMII N/A 46 
Jing Lan Mu He Issuing N/A N/A Shanghai N/A 65 
Shan Cai Da Issuing N/A N/A Shanghai N/A 106 
     
TOTAL 1,415 
Source: CNABS (2017) 
According to the database of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, 10 PPPABS products have been launched in 2017, with underlined assets 
including a tunnel, a toll road, sewage systems, public heating, and municipal projects. 
The issue amount ranges from US$16 million to US$251 million. The sources of 
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payment could be either user payments or government payment. Although the size of 
the PPPABS market is still small, the market potential is significant due to the rapid 
development of both the PPP and ABS markets in China. According to Bridata, as of 
the end of 2017, the total amount of PPP projects filed reached US$2.82 trillion, while 
the number of projects reached 14,059 (Bridata 2017). In the meantime, the current 
ABS market in China has 1,671 products with a total worth of US$ 556.88 billion 
(CNABS 2017).  
 
Figure 10 PPP Market of China (Bridata 2018) 
 
Figure 11 ABS Market of China (CNABS 2018) 
As shown in Table 5, PPPABS is different in many ways from other existing 


































alternative investment to institutional inventors, considering its comparative 
advantages to conventional project finance instruments.  
For example, since the underlying asset is the project’s receivables, the 
infrastructure project is typically at the operational phase. It makes PPPABS products 
naturally construction-risk-free for the investors, while the construction risk is usually 
considered as a major concern of investors with traditional financing methods. Also, 
political risk can be fairly mitigated within the framework of PPP, which offers an 
additional layer of protection to the investors. Furthermore, liquidity of ABS market 
generally outperforms bond and loan markets, which gives investors a lower trading 
cost (Perraudin 2014). Moreover, because SPV is needed to issue the ABS product, 
the bankruptcy risk of the original asset owner will be isolated, comparing with 
traditional coporate investment vehicles. Last but not least, the long maturity, 
information disclousure,and standardization perfectly fit the requirement of investors. 




























Bankruptcy remoteness X X X 
 
Diversification X X X 
 
Long maturity(ALM) X X  X 
Disclosure requirement X X  X 
Standardized vehicle X X  X 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: Identification of Critical Success Factors of PPPABS 
In order to answer the research questions, it is reasonable to start with an 
exploratory study of critical success factors of PPPABS. In this chapter, literature 
analysis is adopted to generate a preliminary list of critical success factors. Then case 
studies are used to explore additional key factors that are not covered in the literature. 
Finally expert interviews are conducted to incorporate ideas from the industry and 
derive the final list of critical success factors, which will be used for further analysis. 
3.1 Literature Analysis 
As shown in Table 6, a preliminary list of CSFs of PPPABS finance is generated 
from a careful literature analysis on CSFs of PPP, ABS, and infrastructure financing. 
First, so as to thoroughly review the findings of existing research, various journals 
and books in the area of PPP, ABS, and infrastructure financing are selected. Then 
target papers and other publications are selected and studied for further analysis. 








Table 6 Identification of Critical Success Factors from Literature 
Critical success factor Reference 
Developed legal framework for 
PPP 
(Cheung et al. 2012; Dulaimi et al. 2010; Hwang 
et al. 2013; Li et al. 2005) 
Clear regulatory body and 
coordination mechanism 
(Hwang et al. 2013; Li et al. 2005) 
Open and transparent approval 
process and information 
disclosure 
(Chan et al. 2010; Gannon and Smith 2011; 
Hwang et al. 2013; Jefferies 2006; Li et al. 2005; 
Meng et al. 2011) 
Mature and effective capital 
market 
(Jefferies 2006; Ozdoganm and Talat Birgonul 
2000; Zhang 2005) 
Accurate pricing based on 
market conditions 
(Chan et al. 2010; Cheung et al. 2012; Dulaimi et 
al. 2010; Olusola Babatunde et al. 2012; Zhang 
2005) 
Receivable of underlying assets 
(user payment, government 
payment, or viability gap 
funding) 
(Ng et al. 2012; Tiong 1996; Zhang 2005) 
Sector of underlying assets 
(water, power, toll fee, etc.) 
(Ng et al. 2012; Tang and Shen 2013) 
Strong private consortium 
(Dulaimi et al. 2010; Hwang et al. 2013; Li et al. 
2005; Nisar 2013; Tang et al. 2012; Tiong 1996; 
Tiong et al. 1992; Zhang 2005) 
The stability of future cash 
flows from the PPP project 
(Dulaimi et al. 2010; Jamali 2004; Jefferies et al. 
2002; Li et al. 2005; Mladenovic et al. 2013) 
Robust overall financial 
package of the project company 
(Ng et al. 2012; Ozdoganm and Talat Birgonul 
2000; Tang et al. 2012; Tiong et al. 1992) 
Reasonable risk allocation and 
clear responsibilities in PPP 
arrangement 
(Chan et al. 2010; Dulaimi et al. 2010; Hwang et 
al. 2013; Li et al. 2005; Meng et al. 2011; Nisar 
2013; Tiong 1996; Zhang 2005) 
Government’s willingness and 
capability to support the project 
and fulfill the agreement 
(Chan et al. 2010; Dulaimi et al. 2010; Gannon 
and Smith 2011; Li et al. 2005; Ozdoganm and 
Talat Birgonul 2000; Tang and Shen 2013; Zhang 
2005) 
Reliable PPP Infrastructure 
service 




3.2 Case Study 
3.2.1 Case Study of Successful World Bank PPP Projects 
A case study on the World Bank’s PPP projects has also been conducted to 
explore indicators of successful projects and learn from the best practice of the World 
Bank operations. Specifically, comparative analysis is applied in the case study to 
highlight similarities, which represent key areas of activity that lead to favorable 
results in the PPP arrangement.  
Regarding private investment in infrastructure, it is intuitive to start with 
successful guarantee projects because guarantee has been proven as an effective 
instrument to mobilize private investment due to efficient mitigation of liquidity risks 
and sector risks. Based on the guarantee project data, twelve projects with sound 
financial plan are firstly selected. After consulting with PPP experts of the World 
Bank, a shortlist of guarantee projects and projects supported by other financial 
instruments is finalized. This study collects information mainly from internal 
documents of the projects, so detailed information will stay undisclosed. 
A sample of six independent PPP projects is carefully analyzed (World Bank 
2017). All the projects involve significant private investment, in six countries with 
diverse macroeconomic schemes, sectors, and regulatory conditions. Countries 
include Lao, Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, and Pakistan. Projects 
have unique characteristics as well as common qualities that worth an in-depth 
investigation. Some highlights from the successful case study for CSFs generation are 
 33 
shown as follows. 
1. All cases point out that political support is a vital factor in PPP arrangements. It is 
crucial because private sector participants in developing countries usually have 
concerns about the government’s willingness and capability to cooperate 
throughout the lifetime of the project. Without the continuous support of the 
government, private investors will be exposed to political uncertainty and risks 
that they can hardly control. Absence of the support may also affect not only the 
approval process of the project but also the receivable-collection of the project 
directly. Besides, the public sector counterparty is in a perfect position to 
eliminate political concerns of the private sector. Constant and strong support by 
the public sector can attract private investors to the country and build up their 
confidence for the future. 
2. A mature and available capital market is also beneficial for investors to lower 
financial cost due to high efficiency, which in turn makes a project financially 
sustainable. A mature market can help infrastructure projects locate financing 
with fairly low cost because of the accurate pricing capability. Moreover, a liquid 
capital market also reduces the trading cost if investors want to exit their 
investment. The capital market does not have to be the domestic market of the 
country. International capital markets can also be depended on if available. 
Financial institutions in an established capital market can also provide a 
professional interpretation of the project finance arrangement, which has a 
 34 
positive impact throughout the lifetime of the partnership. The maturity of 
available capital markets is also one of the reasons why bond markets are popular 
for infrastructure project financing in developed countries, while it is hard for 
projects in developing countries to find low-cost financing vehicles. 
3. Transparency of the procurement process is also identified as crucial because it 
helps eliminate asymmetric information between public and private participants. 
Specifically, tender evaluation criteria and methods should be transparent to 
ensure fair competition and to avoid political favoritism (Zhang 2005).The 
quality and capability of the consortium are usually enhanced by a transparent 
procurement process. Moreover, transparent procurement will also help private 
investors to build up confidence when they are partnering with the government in 
emerging markets. Without the transparency, corruption and bureaucracy may 
happen during the tendering process and hurt the quality of the infrastructure 
service.  
4. A well-developed legal framework for PPP can further secure interests of private 
investors and attract private participation in the first place. As the key to an 
infrastructure project, the contractual arrangement, such as contract type and 
contract award method, depends on the completeness of the legal framework. 
Conflicts and disputes happen during the lifecycle of the project. Therefore, 
accountable legal solutions should be available if communication and negotiation 
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fails. Governance, oversight, and disclosure requirements also need to be 
established.  
5. A streamlined approval process should also be available to enable the 
procurement and delivery of the project. The underlying reason is that an efficient 
approval process at the beginning of the project cycle helps save time, effort, and 
costs for the project. In practice, participants of PPP projects acknowledge that 
challenges exist when obtaining approvals from the government. According to 
Liu and Wilkinson (2013), legislative constraints, uncertainties of demand, the 
financial viability, market appetite and ambiguities in policy objectives are 
typical reasons that cause approval difficulty. The schedule of the project can be 
postponed due to this issue, which will certainly increase the cost for private 
investors and delay the delivery of service. 
6. Clear regulatory bodies or well-organized and committed public agencies are 
required by practitioners, especially in developing countries. Conflicts among 
regulators will result in additional cost and uncertainty for PPP projects. 
Therefore, a clear regulatory body and coordination mechanism is required to 
bring effectiveness and efficiency. Under the governance of such clear regulatory 
agency, a rigorous qualification process usually exists to ensure that the private 
sector project sponsors selected have sufficient experience in developing and 
operating infrastructure projects. A clear regulatory structure can also ensure a 
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smooth approval process mentioned above as well as clear responsibility among 
different parties. 
7. Reasonable risk allocation in PPP arrangement is critical because risk sharing is 
one of the fundamental motivations to have private investment in a public 
infrastructure project. Risks are typically identified, defined, and allocated among 
parties involved, typically the shareholders in the project company, lenders, 
Multilateral Development Banks, and the government. The overall risk can be 
efficiently mitigated by allocating various risks to parties through contractual 
arrangements, usually including a concessional agreement, shareholder agreement, 
design and construction contract, loan agreement, insurance agreement, as well as 
an operation and maintenance agreement. The underlying mechanism is that each 
participant deals with the risks they are capable of managing effectively with 
different mitigation strategies available to them. The synergy effect here creates 
tremendous value by sharing risks. Along with the investment return, the private 
sector should take corresponding risks, transferred from the public sector. There 
is no way to have a successful PPP project without a proper allocation of risks. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to have all six cases identifying this point.  
8. A reliable and strong consortium can provide the capacity of high-quality project 
design, construction, and operation, which affects not only the stability of future 
cash flows of the project but also the partnership with the public sector. In a 
typical PPP project, concessionaire undertakes a broad range of risks and 
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commitment. Consequently, a weakly-structured consortium could bring disaster 
to the project and finally lead to failure. Therefore, a consortium teamed by the 
most experienced and professional companies is critical to assure the 
performance of the project. Most of the time, it can be achieved through a 
transparent and competitive tendering process. Technical advantage and 
sustainable financial arrangement can also be reached due to the dedication of a 
strong consortium. In addition to the financial and technological capabilities, a 
strong consortium usually has robust managerial, partnering, and operational 
skills (Zhang 2005). 
9. Clarity of roles and responsibilities among parties is the foundation of having the 
most efficient performance of the project company. This factor is examined to 
have a strong positive correlation with developed legal framework, well-
organized and committed public agency, clear goals and objectives. For projects 
without a clear definition of roles and responsibilities, it is also difficult for both 
public sector and private investors commit to the development of the project. 
10. Financial capabilities of the private sector play an important role since it means a 
potential lower financial cost and a broad range of financing sources. Because 
private investors and lenders can recourse no other than the cash flows of the 
project company, the financial arrangements are vital to the success of the entire 
project. Public infrastructure projects that are delivered by the private sector 
normally involve private sector funding. In most cases studied, this advantage 
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compensates the difficult fiscal condition of the local government, frees up public 
funding sources for other areas of public service, and improves cash flow 
management of the project. A financial structure designed by an experienced and 
professional private sector can best secure investment returns from the project. 
Because of the private sector’s strong capability, innovative financing 
instruments can be well applied, and financial recourses can be maximized for the 
project. 
11. Appropriate user fees and project receivables need to be well established because 
it usually represents the interests of the public. In the meantime, it is also critical 
to take into account the users’ affordability when designing. For projects that are 
not financially viable with properly designed user fees but have significant social, 
political and environmental impact, additional arrangements and instruments are 
needed, such as public guarantees and subsidies.  
12. Infrastructure service delivery should be reliable during the operation and 
maintenance phase of the infrastructure project to fulfill the fundamental 
requirement of operating the infrastructure project. PPP arrangements have been 
shown to improve service provision under the right circumstances, using 
technical innovations and management skills. This factor may not be available if 




3.2.2 Case Study of Default Infrastructure ABS Products 
Although PPPABS was defined and promoted at the end of 2016, similar ABS 
products with infrastructure receivables as underlying assets do exist on the ABS 
market in China. The only two cases of default or downgraded infrastructure ABS in 
China were also studied to gain a better understanding of successful PPPABS. The 
cases include Dachengxi Yellow River Bridge Toll ABS and Yongli Heat & 
Electricity ABS. Some highlights from the default case study for CSFs generation are 
described below. 
Dachengxi Yellow River Bridge Toll ABS 
On May 29, 2016, a senior A-tranche of Dachengxi Yellow River Bridge toll 
income asset-backed securities missed the due date of regular payment. This is the 
first and only case of default in China’s Infrastructure ABS market. 
The underlying asset is toll revenue of the Dachengxi Yellow River Bridge over 
the six years from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2019, with revenue from Jan and 
Feb excluded for operation expenses. Dachengxi Yellow River Bridge is located in 
Ordos City, with more than 90% of traffic vehicles contributed by coal trucks. 
Therefore, coal production in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region directly 
influences the toll revenue of the Dachengxi Yellow River Bridge. 
The main measures of credit enhancement here include: The issuer itself holds 
subordinate tranche of the ABS; The issuer promises to make up the payment 
whenever there is a deficit of cash flows into the ABS; Issuer’s parent company, 
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Dongda Group (AA- by United Ratings, 2014), provides financial guarantee for 
potential make-up payments; The right to collect toll charges is collateralized to 
guarantee make-up payments and repurchase obligations; The administrator can 
require the issuer to repurchase underline assets if any trigger events happen. 
Major downgrade reasons include: Bridge toll income is significantly reduced 
because the transport of coal vehicles is affected by the downturn of the coal industry; 
Bridge toll charge is almost the only income source of the issuer, so if the transport 
drops, no other sources can help fund the deficiency; Financial performance of 
Dongda Group is also affected by the depressed coal industry, which makes it difficult 
to fulfill the guarantee. 
1. The power of internal credit enhancement measures is usually limited in these 
default cases. For example, deficiency funding is a commonly used credit 
enhancement arrangement, which mandatorily requires the issuer to make up the 
deficit if the project’s receivables alone are not enough to fulfill the cash flow needs 
of the ABS product. In practice, however, if the project receivables cannot generate 
enough cash flows, there are no other sources that can help fund the deficiency, since 
operating the infrastructure asset is always the only business of the project company 
in a PPP arrangement.  
2. Prediction of cash flows is the key to assess risks. However, uncertainties of 
the market and industry policy changes make the prediction a very tricky task. In this 
case, since coal trucks contribute ninety percent of transportation across the bridge, 
 41 
the dropping transportation amount is mainly due to the slower local economy and the 
national green energy policy released.  
3. If the income of the project company can be influenced by policy changes 
dramatically, relative clauses of government support in the contracts need to be 
cautiously examined when constructing the securitization deal. 
4. For operational cost considerations, original asset owners themselves usually 
are responsible for collecting cash flows of underlying assets, rather than third-party 
institutions in developed countries. In practice, investors are often unable to get first-
hand information. 
5. Because the original asset owner is responsible for collecting cash flows of 
underlying assets, rather than third-party institutions, the consolidation and allocation 
of cash flows during the lifetime of ABS products need to be considered carefully at 
the very beginning.  
6. Lack of appropriate solutions to follow after default events makes it very 
difficult to alleviate the situation. This point also accords with expert opinions in the 
interview session. 
Yongli Heat and Electricity ABS 
Aug 2016, a senior tranche of Yongli Heat and Electricity ABS was downgraded 
from AA+ to AA by Pengyuan Credit Rating. 
The underlying asset is revenue of Yongli Co. Ltd. from ongoing heat and 
electricity contracts with certain clients over the next three years. Yongli is located in 
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Shaoxing City, Zhejiang Province. It supplies all electricity generated to the Bureau of 
Electricity of Shaoxing City by contract. Moreover, its heat clients are textile 
companies concentrated in a certain industrial area of Shaoxing City. Therefore, the 
textile industry in Shaoxing City directly affects the revenue of Yongli. 
The main measures of credit enhancement here include: The issuer itself holds 
subordinate tranche of the ABS; The issuer promises to make up the payment 
whenever there is a deficit of cash flows into the ABS; Issuer’s parent company, 
Yongli Group, which is also in textile industry provides financial guarantee. 
Major downgrade reasons include: Electricity income declined because of the 
trending down price of electricity; Because of more restrictive environmental 
requirements, textile companies constantly move out of that area, which contributed 
to 83% of Yongli’s heat revenue. Although Yongli promises the deficit payment, 
since almost all of its revenue is already securitized, there are no other sources of 
income it can depend on to make the payment if cash flow from the underlying assets 
goes wrong. Yongli Group is also in the textile industry, which makes it difficult to 
fulfill the guarantee because of the strong correlation of business. 
1. The power of internal credit enhancement measures, such as deficiency 
funding, is also limited in this case as operating the infrastructure asset is the only 
business of the project company. Both cases infer that credit enhancement needs to be 
carefully reviewed and proved effective by rating agencies. 
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2. If financial guarantee providers are in related industries, the ability to fulfill 
guarantees declines whenever the underlying assets suffer from industry downswing. 
In this heat & power ABS case, most of the income from heat is generated from the 
local textile industry. At the same time, the major revenue of the financial guarantee 
provider (Yongli Group) also comes from the textile sector. Therefore, external credit 
enhancement might be not as effective as a guarantee from irrelevant industries. 
3. In-depth research on original source of income of underlying assets is the key 
to analysis risks, especially for uniqueness and stability concerns.  
3.3 Expert Interview 
From Dec 2016 to Jan 2017, 36 expert interviews had been conducted to validate 
the list of CSFs and collect additional knowledge. Experts are especially experienced 
in either PPP or ABS from different industries, including Government, Investors, 
Investment Banking/Rating Agencies, Designer/Engineer/Contractor, 
Consultant/Lawyer/Accountant, and Academia.  
Formats of the structured interview include face-to-face interviews and phone 
interviews. Interviewees were provided with a preliminary list of CSFs and required 
to discuss each factor on the list and assessment of PPPABS in general. After 
incorporating experts’ opinions on the preliminary list, a final list of CSFs is 




Table 7 Final List of CSFs 
# Critical success factor 
V1 Developed legal framework for PPP 
V2 Clear regulatory body and coordination mechanism for such financial 
instrument 
V3 Open and transparent approval process and information disclosure 
V4 Relevant tax standards 
V5 Relevant accounting standards 
V6 Mature and effective capital market 
V7 Objective and accurate credit rating 
V8 Accurate pricing based on market conditions 
V9 Active and liquid secondary market 
V10 Market access threshold release to more investors 
V11 Receivable of underlying assets (user payment, government payment, or 
viability gap funding) 
V12 Sector of underlying assets (water, power, toll fee, etc.) 
V13 Strong private consortium 
V14 The stability of future cash flows from the PPP project 
V15 Robust overall financial package of the project company 
V16 Reasonable risk allocation and clear responsibilities in PPP arrangement 
V17 Government’s willingness and capability to support the project and fulfill the 
agreement 
V18 Reliable PPP Infrastructure service 
V19 Stage of the underlying project at issuance and maturity of ABS product 
V20 Proper risk reallocation after securitization 
V21 Bankruptcy remoteness effect due to securitization 
V22 Underwriter and trustee’s expertise in infrastructure 
V23 Cash flows management during the lifetime of ABS product 
V24 Relief responses when default happens 
V25 Transfer and delivery of underlying asset 
In this chapter, a list of CSFs is generated through a careful literature analysis, 
case studies, and expert interviews. It shall serve as the foundation of feasibility 
assessment of PPPABS financing opportunities. An empirical study will be designed 
and conducted based on this list in the following chapter. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: Empirical Study of Critical Success Factors of 
PPPABS 
In the previous chapters, asset-backed securitization is proposed as an innovative 
financing instrument for infrastructure projects. In order to expand financing channels, 
tap private funds, provide secondary market liquidity to PPP investment, PPP 
infrastructure ABS is defined and promoted in China in 2016. Projects’ future 
receivables are structured as underlined assets.  
Compared with conventional financing methods, such as project loans and 
project bonds, PPPABS is different in many ways. First, since recievables are required 
as underlined asset, infrastructure projects are typically at the operation phase with far 
less construction risk embedded. Second, political risk can be fairly mitigated within 
the risk sharing mechnism of PPP. Third, since a special purpose vehicle (SPV) is 
needed for structuring the ABS product, it provide a bankruptcy remoteness effect to 
institutional investors. Moreover, tranches of cash flows with different risk/return 
profiles can be desinged in an ABS financing arangement. Finally, liquidity of ABS 
products in general also outperforms bond and loan products, which gives investors a 
lower trading cost (Perraudin 2014).  
The aim of this chapter is to design an empirical study to collect data for further 
analysis, based on the list of CSFs. Descriptive analysis, agreement analysis, and 
ANOVA will be applied for preliminary interpretation. 
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4.1 Survey Design 
Based on the list of CSFs generated, a questionnaire survey was designed to 
collect firsthand opinions of industry practitioners in China. It was conducted via 
expert interviews and social media groups of PPP and ABS from Jan to Mar 2017. A 
pilot survey was conducted to ensure the correct interpretation of the questionnaire 
(Dillman 2011). Slight adjustments were made afterward. The final questionnaire was 
sent to both experts and groups of practitioners in the field of PPP and ABS 
(Appendix I & II). The survey was sent out with a cover letter to illustrate the aim of 
the work and assure the confidentiality. Follow-up reminders were frequently made to 
collect the responses.  
The questionnaire includes 4 major sections: 1. Benefits and challenges of 
PPPABS; 2. CSFs of PPPABS; 3. Suitable assets/investors for PPPABS; 4. 
Respondents’ profiles and experiences. In this chapter, we are focusing on the section 
of CSFs of PPPABS financing. In this section, respondents are invited to assign the 
scale of importance to 25 CSFs within a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 = Not Important, 
2 = Less Important, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Important, and 5 = Very Important (Dillman 
2011). For regulatory level CSFs and market level CSFs, the status quo performance 
of these CSFs in China is also required to measure the gap between market 
expectation and the current situation at the macro level. For product level CSFs, status 
quo performance is not required because PPP projects are distinct from each other, 
which makes the assessment impossible to give. 
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125 people replied to the questionnaire and submitted their answers online. 6 
careless responses were identified and removed (Dillman 2011; Meade and Craig 
2012). Among the 119 effective replies, respondents are well distributed in different 
industries, including Government, Investors, Investment Banks/Rating Agencies, 
Designer/Engineer/Contractor, Consultant/Lawyer/Accountant, Academia, and Others. 
Unsurprisingly, as shown in Table 8, there are plenty of respondents from financial 
institutions interested in this topic. According to interviewees from investment banks 
and rating agencies, this is mainly because finance professionals are particularly 
interested in business opportunities along with such new financing vehicle, 
considering the enormous market of PPP in China. 
Table 8 Respondents by Industry 
Industry Frequency Percent 
Government 12 10.1 
Investor 15 12.6 
Investment Banks/Rating Agencies 42 35.3 
Designer/Engineer/Contractor 10 8.4 
Consultant/Lawyer/Accountant 18 15.1 
Academia 17 14.3 
Other 5 4.2 
Total 119 100.0 
The working experience of the respondents is also well balanced from entry-
level staff to very experienced experts. Respondents are categorized into different 
types of experts by collecting their experience for both PPP and ABS. Although the 
first PPP project in China was practiced since the 90’s, the prosperous atmosphere of 
the PPP industry only started in 2014. Securitization market in China started from 
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2005, stagnated from 2009 to 2011 after the financial crisis, and then restarted from 
2012 until the present. Due to the short but prosperous development of China’s PPP 
and ABS market, practitioners with more than 5 years of experience can be considered 
an expert in the industry. Experts of PPP represented 25.2% of respondents. Experts 
with ABS background represented 28.6% of respondents. Experts with both PPP and 
ABS background represented 16.8% of respondents. 
Table 9 Respondents by Work Experience 
Experience Frequency Percent 
<5 yrs 48 40.3 
5-10 yrs 27 22.7 
>10 yrs 44 37.0 
Total 119 100.0 
Table 10 Respondents by Expert Type 
Expert Type Frequency Percent 
Respondents with  
limited experience 
35 29.4 
Experts with PPP  
experience  
30 25.2 
Experts with ABS  
experience  
34 28.6 
Experts with PPP& 
ABS experience  
20 16.8 
Total 119 100.0 
4.2 Reliability Test 
Cronbach’s Alpha method was carried out to test the reliability and consistency 
of the survey data. According to the result, Cronbach’s Alpha value (0.868), falling 
between 0.8 and 0.9, indicates that the internal consistency is good (George and 
Mallery 2003; Kline 2013; Nunnally 1978). That is to say, the information from the 
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questionnaire survey is considered consistent and reliable.   
Moreover, Kendall’s W method was applied to examine the agreement level 
among respondents. As the number of questions is larger than 7, a Chi-square test is 
used to determine whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis (Siegel and Castellan 
Jr 1988). The Chi-square value under Kendall’s W Test is 377.129, greater than 
42.980 (99% confidence level, 24 degrees of freedom) implies a certain degree of 
general agreement among respondents and confirms the reliability of the survey.  
4.3 Benefits and Challenges 
Benefits and challenges of PPPABS as an alternative financing method are also 
studied. Opinions of respondents are illustrated in this section.  
For issuers, all benefits except “Off-balance-sheet financing opportunity” are 
believed to be significant as the average ratings are larger than 3.5. “Off-balance-sheet 
financing opportunity” is a typical benefit that securitization can provide to the issuers. 
However, since the underlined asset of this specific PPPABS arrangement is the future 
receivables of PPP project, the “Off-balance-sheet financing opportunity” benefit 
cannot be achieved if the asset has not truly sold to the ABS SPV. 
The benefit of PPPABS financing that experts agree the most is to provide exit 
opportunity to the investors. The following one is to reduce financing costs by taking 
advantage of credit enhancement arrangements. This result coincides with the 
motivation of promoting PPPABS by the government of China at the national level. 
“The securitization of PPP-funded projects can help expand funding channels, lower 
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financing costs and better attract private capital”, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) mentioned. 
For ABS investors, all benefits except “Provide PPP investment exposure to 
individual investors” and “Legal arrangement of SPV provide risk isolation from the 
issuer” are believed to be significant as the average ratings are larger than 3.5. 
According to some experts’ enlightenment, although individual investors can have 
access to these ABS products though special portfolios of their bank account, it should 
not be considered as exposure to PPP investment since it is not a direct investment. 
Commercial banks are the actual risk-taker and thus get exposure to the investment in 
PPPABS. Moreover, because China’s current legal framework does not fully support 
true sale of underlined asset, the benefit of SPV’s bankruptcy remoteness effect can 
hardly be achieved in China. 
The mostly agreed benefits of PPPABS for investors are to provide “More 
transparent information disclosure due to the capital market requirement”, “long-term 
oriented institutional investors with infrastructure investments that also focus on long-
term management and operation”, and “Provide an alternative investment to investors 
who wish to diversify portfolio”. According to experts from financial institutions, 
these qualities are extremely attractive to potential investors. And PPP related assets 
can serve as an asset/liability matching tool for institutional investors to achieve long 
term capital gain. 
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Table 11 Benefits of PPPABS 
Benefits Order Min Max Mean SD 
For Issuer 
Provide exit opportunity to the investors 1 1 5 4.06 .942 
Sponsor can take advantage of credit 
enhancement arrangements to reduce financing 
costs. 
2 1 5 3.70 1.196 
Investors from the capital market help share 
some risk of PPP project. 
3 1 5 3.68 .958 
Provide new financing method to the project 
company 
4 1 5 3.66 1.323 
Provide liquidity to PPP investment 5 1 5 3.60 1.262 
Off-balance-sheet financing opportunity 6 1 5 3.21 1.197 
For ABS Investor 
More transparent information disclosure due to 
the capital market requirement 
1 1 5 3.96 .999 
Provide long-term oriented institutional 
investors with infrastructure investments that 
also focus on long-term management and 
operation 
2 1 5 3.87 1.035 
Provide an alternative investment to investors 
who wish to diversify portfolio 
3 1 5 3.85 1.063 
Provide PPP investment exposure to individual 
investors 
4 1 5 3.45 1.348 
Legal arrangement of SPV provides bankruptcy 
remoteness from the issuer 
5 1 5 2.98 1.207 
Compared to benefits of PPPABS, ratings of challenges are relatively lower, 
which shows practitioners are optimistic to this market. For the issuer, the only 
challenge gets a 3.5 above rating is “Both current PPP and ABS regulatory guidance 
are not refined enough”. Practitioners have some concerns that uncompleted 
regulatory framework of such financial innovation may lead to hidden troubles in the 
future. Except for this concern, practitioners do not pay much attention to other 
drawbacks PPPABS may have, such as “Complex legal and contractual preparation”, 
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“Lower power of credit enhancement as government is not allowed to secure the 
revenue for PPP projects currently”, “O&M service of PPP project is not guaranteed 
during the lifetime of entire ABS product”, “Additional complexity and uncertainty 
due to public participation”, and “Additional transactional cost”. 
For ABS investors, most agreed challenge is “As the concession is difficult to 
transfer to the SPV under current relative law, it is difficult to achieve complete 
bankruptcy remoteness.” This opinion accords with the low rating of benefit “Legal 
arrangement of SPV provides bankruptcy remoteness from the issuer”. In addition, 
current inactive secondary market is also a hurdle to take full advantage of 
securitization. This is mainly because most investors of such products will hold the 
investment until maturity. However, experts believe that as the market grows, 
institutional investors will have more room to trade these ABS products. Therefore, 
liquidity will not be a problem if the market keeps growing. 
Table 12 Challenges of PPPABS 
Challenges Order Min Max Mean SD 
For Issuer 
Both current PPP and ABS regulatory guidance 
are not refined enough. 
1 1 5 3.87 1.013 
Complex legal and contractual preparation 2 2 5 3.34 .984 
Lower power of credit enhancement as 
government is not allowed to secure the 
revenue for PPP projects currently. 
3 1 5 3.32 1.105 
O&M service of PPP project is not guaranteed 
during the lifetime of entire ABS product. 
4 1 5 3.28 1.174 
Additional complexity and uncertainty due to 
public participation 
5 1 5 3.23 1.255 
Additional transactional cost 6 1 5 3.13 .969 
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For ABS Investor 
As the concession is difficult to transfer to the 
SPV under current relative law, it is difficult to 
achieve complete bankruptcy remoteness. 
1 2 5 3.94 .987 
Currently trading is not active in secondary 
market. 
2 1 5 3.87 .992 
The close relationship between the PPP investor 
and the project company is likely to result in a 
risk of cash flow mixing and liquidity shortfall. 
3 1 5 3.45 1.100 
Asymmetric information between the sponsor 
and the ABS investors 
4 1 5 3.40 1.210 
Systematic risk due to potential abuse of 
derivatives in the future 
5 1 5 3.06 1.150 
The interests of individual investors are not 
easy to protect. 
6 1 5 3.04 1.233 
4.4 Suitable Assets and Investors 
Respondents are also asked to rate the suitability of three major types of PPP 
projects as the underlined asset of PPPABS. According to survey result, there is a 
clear preference on PPP projects with user payment as the main source of income. As 
rating of the suitability of government payment as underlined asset is only 3.4, 
practitioners agree that PPP projects with only government payment as income are not 
as suitable as projects with user payment as income source for financing though PPP 
securitization. Viability gap funding lies in the middle of user payment and 
government payment as suitable underlined asset.  
This result indicates that the more government payment contribution in the 
project income, the less suitability for the project to be financed though PPPABS. One 
thing needs to be mentioned is that this finding is quite different from the common 
knowledge and experience in developed countries. For instance, due to the strong 
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credit system and mature bond market, public authorities in U.S. usually have the 
privilege of acquiring financing sources with relatively low financial cost. The market 
generally appreciates the strong credit of public sector supported by the power of 
collecting tax. In China, however, the practitioners clearly prefer collecting tariffs 
directly from the projects rather than relying on the credit of the public sector. 
Table 13 Suitable Receivable of Underlined Assets 
Receivable of underlined assets N Min Max Mean SD 
User payment 119 1 5 4.23 .943 
Viability gap funding 119 2 5 3.88 .750 
Government payment 119 1 5 3.40 1.115 
In the meantime, pension funds and insurance companies are rated very suitable 
for investing PPPABS products by practitioners including institutional investors. The 
order form the highest suitability rating to the lowest is “Insurance companies”, 
“Commercial Banks”, “Pension funds”, “Mutual funds” “Trust company” 
“Finance/Investment business of corporations” “Proprietary trading of Investment 
Banks”, and “Hedge funds”. This result accords with many studies on infrastructure 
financing.  
Due to the asset/liability matching need, institutional investors, such as insurance 
companies and pension funds, are recommended as suitable funding sources of 
infrastructure projects. The high suitability rating of commercial banks is because of 
the unique environment in China, as these financial institutions, mostly state-owned, 
play key roles in every aspect of the financial market. Although short-term liabilities 
of commercial banks usually do not match long-term investment assets like PPP 
 55 
projects, these financial institutions are just too big to fail, according to the experts. 
Table 14 Suitable Institutional Investors 
Suitable Investors for such PPPABS Products N Min Max Mean SD 
Insurance companies 119 2 5 4.07 .851 
Commercial Banks 119 1 5 3.91 .911 
Pension funds 119 1 5 3.90 1.028 
Mutual funds 119 1 5 3.82 .947 
Trust company 119 1 5 3.77 .987 
Finance/Investment business of corporations 119 1 5 3.77 1.020 
Proprietary trading of Investment Banks 119 1 5 3.58 1.021 
Hedge funds 119 1 5 3.43 1.239 
4.5 Descriptive Analysis of CSFs 
CSFs at the Regulatory Level 
The mean of regulatory level CSFs is 4.56 out of 5. The high ratings of all five 
regulatory level CSFs show that regulatory issues are given careful attention by 
practitioners in relevant industries. The order from the highest rating to the lowest is 
“Developed legal framework for PPP”, “Open and transparent approval process and 
information disclosure”, “Clear regulatory body and coordination mechanism for such 
financial instrument”, “Relevant tax standards”, and “Relevant accounting standards”.  
A favorable PPP investment environment for private investors cannot exist 
without a developed legal framework. The highest rating given by the respondents 
from both PPP and ABS industries further prove this observation. Apparently, 
transparency of a certain market is also important toward maturity. It can help 
eliminate asymmetric information between the issuer and investor of ABS product, 
and thus makes securitization more efficient as a financing method as well as an 
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alternative investment. “Clear regulatory body and coordination mechanism” is 
required by the practitioner as political concerns are always one of the key issues that 
investors pay attention to, especially in developing countries. Lack of clear regulation 
will result in additional cost and uncertainty. Therefore, a clear regulatory body and 
coordination mechanism will definitely bring effectiveness and efficiency to such a 
new financing method. Last but not least, tax and accounting standards are considered 
to be important because these standards significantly influence the capital return of 
the investor and the financial cost of the issuer respectively. 
Table 15 Importance of CSFs at Regulatory Level 
Critical success factor N Min Max Mean SD 
V1- Developed legal framework for PPP 119 4 5 4.76 .426 
V2-Clear regulatory body and coordination 
mechanism for such financial instrument 
119 2 5 4.60 .668 
V3-Open and transparent approval process and 
information disclosure 
119 2 5 4.71 .584 
V4-Relevant tax standards 119 2 5 4.45 .673 
V5-Relevant accounting standards 119 1 5 4.25 .856 
As shown in Table 16, the ratings of all five regulatory level CSFs show that 
practitioners in China are not satisfied with the status quo environment of regulation. 
Compared to the importance rating of 4.56, the mean of current performance is only 
2.58. The order from the highest rating to the lowest is “Relevant accounting 
standards”, “Open and transparent approval process and information disclosure”, 
“Clear regulatory body and coordination mechanism for such financial instrument”, 
“Relevant tax standards”, and “Developed legal framework for PPP”. 
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Table 16 Status of CSFs at Regulatory Level in China 
Critical success factor N Min Max Mean SD 
V1'-Developed legal framework for PPP 119 1 5 2.42 .868 
V2'-Clear regulatory body and coordination 
mechanism for such financial instrument 
119 1 5 2.64 1.015 
V3'-Open and transparent approval process and 
information disclosure 
119 1 5 2.66 .950 
V4'-Relevant tax standards 119 1 5 2.49 .982 
V5'-Relevant accounting standards 119 1 5 2.71 .894 
To give the public authorities a hint on which factors to improve urgently in the 
future, Table 17 is used to illustrate how the status/importance profile can be 
calculated to rank these factors. Observations can be made that the higher a factor’s 
importance rating is and the lower a factor’s status rating is, the more urgent it is to 
improve this factor. For example, V1 (Developed legal framework for PPP) is 
considered as the first factor to improve with the lowest S/I value, followed by V4 
(Relevant tax standards), V3 (Open and transparent approval process and information 
disclosure), V2 (Clear regulatory body and coordination mechanism for such financial 
instrument), and V5 (Relevant accounting standards). 
Table 17 Improvement Rank of CSFs at Regulatory Level 
Critical success factor Importance Status S/I Rank 
V1-Developed legal framework for PPP 4.76 2.42 0.5079 1 
V2-Clear regulatory body and coordination 
mechanism for such financial instrument 
4.60 2.64 0.5740 4 
V3-Open and transparent approval process 
and information disclosure 
4.71 2.66 0.5651 3 
V4-Relevant tax standards 4.45 2.49 0.5595 2 
V5-Relevant accounting standards 4.25 2.71 0.6383 5 
CSFs at Market Level 
The mean of market level CSFs is 4.47 out of 5. The high ratings of market level 
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CSFs show that practitioners agree that a mature and efficient capital market is crucial 
to the success of such financial innovation. The order from the highest rating to the 
lowest is “Mature and effective capital market”, “Objective and accurate credit rating”, 
“Market access threshold release to more investors”, “Active and liquid secondary 
market”, and “Accurate pricing based on market conditions”.  
 “Mature and effective capital market” can help issuers achieve lower financial 
cost. This is one of the reasons why bond markets in developed countries are very 
popular for infrastructure project finance. Many experts brought up during the 
interview that “Objective and accurate credit rating” is the key because the expertise 
of the rating agencies can provide a first-hand data and professional interpretation on 
the underlying asset of PPPABS product, which has an impact throughout the entire 
lifetime of the financing arrangement. “Active and liquid secondary market” is critical 
because inactive and illiquid secondary market will increase the total cost of 
investment while trading and decrease the overall investment return. “Accurate 
pricing based on market conditions” will bring efficiency to the bidding process of 
PPPABS product and allow the issuer acquire financing with a fair cost. “Market 
access threshold release to more investors” shows that practitioners would like to have 
more types of active investors in this market, while commercial banks are the major 




Table 18 Importance of CSFs at Market Level 
Critical success factor N Min Max Mean SD 
V6-Mature and effective capital market 119 2 5 4.66 .641 
V7-Objective and accurate credit rating 119 2 5 4.64 .673 
V8-Accurate pricing based on market conditions 119 2 5 4.30 .683 
V9-Active and liquid secondary market 119 1 5 4.34 .797 
V10-Market access threshold release to more 
investors 
119 2 5 4.40 .655 
As it shows in Table 19, the low ratings of market level CSFs show that 
practitioners in China are not satisfied with the status quo situation of market 
environment. Compared to the importance rating of 4.47, the mean of current 
performance is only 2.70. The order from the highest rating to the lowest is 
“Objective and accurate credit rating”, “Mature and effective capital market”, 
“Market access threshold release to more investors”, “Accurate pricing based on 
market conditions”, and “Active and liquid secondary market”. 
Table 19 Status of CSFs at Market Level in China 
Critical success factor N Min Max Mean SD 
V6'-Mature and effective capital market 119 1 5 2.78 .967 
V7'-Objective and accurate credit rating 119 1 5 2.80 1.078 
V8'-Accurate pricing based on market conditions 119 1 5 2.58 .970 
V9'-Active and liquid secondary market 119 1 5 2.57 1.132 
V10'-Market access threshold release to more 
investors 
119 1 5 2.78 1.075 
In order to show the practitioners a hint on which factors to improve in the future, 
Table 20 is used to illustrate how the status/importance profile can be used to rank 
these factors. Observations can be made that the higher a factor’s importance rating is 
and the lower a factor’s status rating is, the more urgent it is to improve this factor. 
For example, V9 (Active and liquid secondary market) is considered as the first factor 
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to improve with the lowest S/I value, followed by V6 (Mature and effective capital 
market), V8 (Accurate pricing based on market conditions), V7 (Objective and 
accurate credit rating), and V10 (Market access threshold release to more investors).  
Table 20 Improvement Rank of CSFs at Market Level 
Critical success factor Importance Status S/I Rank 
V6-Mature and effective capital market 4.66 2.78 0.5964 2 
V7-Objective and accurate credit rating 4.64 2.80 0.6033 4 
V8-Accurate pricing based on market 
conditions 
4.30 2.58 0.5996 3 
V9-Active and liquid secondary market 4.34 2.57 0.5919 1 
V10-Market access threshold release to more 
investors 
4.40 2.78 0.6317 5 
CSFs at Product Level - PPP 
The mean of product level PPP CSFs is 4.36 out of 5. Clearly, respondents agree 
that the qualities of PPP project are fundamental toward a successful PPPABS 
financing. The order from the highest rating to the lowest is, “The stability of future 
cash flows from the PPP project”, “Government’s willingness and capability to 
support the project and fulfill the agreement”, “Reasonable risk allocation and clear 
responsibilities in PPP arrangement”, “Receivable of underlying assets (user payment, 
government payment, or viability gap funding)”, “Reliable PPP Infrastructure service”, 
“Strong private consortium”, “Sector of underlying assets (water, power, toll fee, 
etc.)”, and “Robust overall financial package of the project company”.  
 “The stability of future cash flows from the PPP project” is considered to be the 
most critical factors among PPP related factors. This issue echoed with most experts’ 
opinion during the interviews. “Government’s willingness and capability to support 
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the project and fulfill the agreement” is rated high because private sector participants 
usually have concerns about the public sector’s support and cooperation during the 
lifecycle of the PPP project. “Reasonable risk allocation and clear responsibilities in 
PPP arrangement” is important because it usually determines whether the partnership 
is well-structured among parties effectively. According to Table 13, opinions on 
“Receivable of underlying assets” show that the higher the government payments 
contributed to the project’s income, the less suitable the project is to be financed 
through PPPABS. Practitioners also show a clear favor to “Reliable PPP Infrastructure 
service”. This factor is important because the operation & maintenance service may 
not be maintained by the initial consortium if they have already securitized the future 
incomes and collected capital with returns. “Strong private consortium” is crucial 
because it influences not only the cash flows of the project but also the partnership 
with the public sector. “Sector of underlying assets (water, power, toll fee, etc.)” is 
considered to show different characteristics of the underlying assets and thus 
influence the structure of future incomes and credit ratings. “Robust overall financial 
package of the project company” plays an important role since it varies from project 






Table 21 Importance of CSFs at Product Level-PPP 
Critical success factor N Min Max Mean SD 
V11- Receivable of underlying assets (user 
payment, government payment, or viability gap 
funding) 
119 1 5 4.39 .826 
V12- Sector of underlying assets (water, power, 
toll fee, etc.) 
119 1 5 3.95 1.024 
V13- Strong private consortium 119 2 5 4.34 .728 
V14- The stability of future cash flows from the 
PPP project 
119 3 5 4.69 .564 
V15- Robust overall financial package of the 
project company 
119 2 5 3.91 .823 
V16- Reasonable risk allocation and clear 
responsibilities in PPP arrangement 
119 3 5 4.58 .617 
V17- Government’s willingness and capability to 
support the project and fulfill the agreement 
119 2 5 4.63 .649 
V18- Reliable PPP Infrastructure service 119 2 5 4.37 .711 
CSFs at Product Level – ABS 
The mean of product level Securitization CSFs is 4.30 out of 5. Respondents 
believe that the securitization is an important and professional financial technique 
which requires extensive knowledge and experience. Therefore, securitization-related 
factors will certainly influence the result of PPPABS financing. The order from the 
highest rating to the lowest is “Relief responses when default happens”, “Transfer and 
delivery of underlying asset”, “Bankruptcy remoteness effect due to securitization”, 
“Cash flows management during the lifetime of ABS product”, “Stage of the 
underlying project at issuance and maturity of ABS product”, “Proper risk reallocation 
after securitization”, and “Underwriter and trustee’s expertise in infrastructure”.  
 “Relief responses when default happens” is the top-rated factor in the category 
of ABS product level, which shows practitioners are cautious about default and would 
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like to know their options in default scenarios. “Transfer and delivery of underlying 
asset” is usually brought up while interviewing lawyers as the future income does not 
show in the balance sheet so that it may need specific legal arrangements to transfer 
the asset. “Bankruptcy remoteness effect due to securitization” is one of the key 
characteristics of ABS financing. By using a special purpose vehicle, default risk of 
the original asset owner (e.g., project company) will be detached from the PPPABS 
product. Accordingly, the investors of ABS product can be immune to the default risk 
of the original asset owner. “Cash flows management during the lifetime of ABS 
product” is usually undertaken with a special account. However, since this account is 
under control by the project company, there are risks that management uses the money 
for other purposes instead of transfer to the ABS investors. “Stage of the underlying 
project at issuance and maturity of ABS product” may have an impact on the structure 
of the ABS product as well as the risk of PPP project. A project in the construction 
phase usually is riskier than a project in the operation phase. As investors of ABS 
product certainly share some of the risks of the PPP project, “Proper risk reallocation 
after securitization” is important when structuring the ABS deal. “Underwriter and 
trustee’s expertise in infrastructure” is believed to be very helpful to the success of 
ABS financing. Knowledgeable financial institutions with infrastructure expertise can 
serve as the link between both issuers and institutional investors, by providing 
professional advice and information.  
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Table 22 Importance of CSFs at Product Level-ABS 
Critical success factor N Min Max Mean SD 
V19-Stage of the underlying project at issuance 
and maturity of ABS product 
119 2 5 4.19 .728 
V20-Proper risk reallocation after securitization 119 2 5 4.18 .747 
V21- Bankruptcy remoteness effect due to 
securitization 
119 2 5 4.41 .730 
V22- Underwriter and trustee’s expertise in 
infrastructure 
119 1 5 4.01 .907 
V23-Cash flows management during the lifetime of 
ABS product 
119 2 5 4.35 .659 
V24-Relief responses when default happens 119 1 5 4.53 .711 
V25-Transfer and delivery of underlying asset 119 2 5 4.41 .764 
4.6 Opinion Comparison among Experts 
During the expert interviews and questionnaire survey, it is not hard to observe 
that participants of this new market are mostly from either PPP or ABS industry. This 
situation may lead to different interpretations among the respondents and potential 
misunderstanding and conflicts in the further. Therefore, some work needs to be done 
to forecast the potential conflicts. In this part, agreement analysis and ANOVA are 
adopted to analyze the survey data to identify the differences among the respondents. 
4.6.1 Agreement Analysis of CSFs 
Based on the work of Okpala and Aniekwu (1988), agreement analysis is 
adopted to measure the agreement level in the ranking of these CSFs. The “rank 
agreement factor” (RAF) is defined as the average absolute difference in the ranking 
of the CSFs between two groups. The maximum rank agreement factor 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫ is 
the maximum possible RAF for N items. The percentage disagreement (PD) is 
defined as RAF divided by𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫. The percentage agreement (PA) is defined as 1 
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minus PD (Zhang 2005). 












         PA = 1 − PD 
To compare opinions of experts from PPP and ABS, we define Group 0 as 
practitioner with moderate PPP and ABS experience, Group 1 as experts with 
intensive PPP experience, Group 2 as experts with intensive ABS experience, and 
Group 3 as experts with both PPP and ABS experience. The opinion comparison 
between PPP experts and ABS experts will be focused on in this section. 
The calculation process of RAFs, 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫s, and PAs for CSFs at regulatory 
level is shown in Tables 23 and 24. Experts show general agreement on the order of 
CSFs at regulatory level from V1 to V5. The PA between Group 0 and 2, PA between 
Group 0 and 3, as well as PA between Group 2 and 3 are 100%. This result 
demonstrates complete agreement among experts from Group 0, 2, and 3. The PA 
between Group 0 and 1, PA between Group 1 and 2, as well as PA between Group 1 
and 3, are 83%. To conclude, there is a strong agreement level in the ranking between 
the PPP and ABS communities at regulatory level. 
Table 23 Mean and Rank of Regulatory Level CSFs for Agreement Analysis 
Critical success factor 
G0 G1 G2 G3 
M R M R M R M R 
Developed legal framework for PPP 4.83 1 4.60 2 4.79 1 4.85 1 
Clear regulatory body and coordination 
mechanism for such financial instrument 
4.63 3 4.53 3 4.68 3 4.50 3 
Open and transparent approval process and 
information disclosure 
4.71 2 4.67 1 4.76 2 4.70 2 
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Relevant tax standards 4.51 4 4.30 4 4.53 4 4.40 4 
Relevant accounting standards 4.40 5 4.13 5 4.41 5 3.90 5 
Table 24 Agreement Analysis for Regulatory Level CSFs 
 
RAF 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫ PD PA 
G0&G1 0.40 2.40 17% 83% 
G0&G2 0.00 2.40 0% 100% 
G0&G3 0.00 2.40 0% 100% 
G1&G2 0.40 2.40 17% 83% 
G1&G3 0.40 2.40 17% 83% 
G2&G3 0.00 2.40 0% 100% 
The RAFs, 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫s, and PAs for CSFs at market Level are shown in Tables 25 
and 26. Experts show agreement on the order of CSFs at market Level from V6 to 
V10. It can be seen that the PAs range from 50 to 83%. In conclusion, there is a 
moderate agreement in the ranking between the PPP and ABS communities at market 
level. 
Table 25 Mean and Rank of Market Level CSFs for Agreement Analysis 
Critical success factor 
G0 G1 G2 G3 
M R M R M R M R 
Mature and effective capital market 4.66 1 4.67 2 4.74 1 4.55 2 
Objective and accurate credit rating 4.54 2 4.67 1 4.71 2 4.65 1 
Accurate pricing based on market 
conditions 
4.26 5 4.43 4 4.32 4 4.15 5 
Active and liquid secondary market 4.37 4 4.53 3 4.24 5 4.20 4 
Market access threshold release to more 
investors 
4.51 3 4.23 5 4.50 3 4.30 3 
Table 26 Agreement Analysis for Market Level CSFs 
 
RAF 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫ PD PA 
G0&G1 1.20 2.40 50% 50% 
G0&G2 0.40 2.40 17% 83% 
G0&G3 0.40 2.40 17% 83% 
G1&G2 1.20 2.40 50% 50% 
G1&G3 0.80 2.40 33% 67% 
G2&G3 0.80 2.40 33% 67% 
 67 
The RAFs, 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫s, and PAs for PPP-related CSFs at product level are shown 
in Tables 27 and 28. Experts show agreement on the order of Product Level-PPP CSFs 
from V11 to V18. It can be seen that the PAs range from 59 to 84%. Therefore, there 
is a moderate agreement in the ranking between the PPP and ABS communities at 
product-PPP level. 
Table 27 Mean and Rank of Product Level-PPP CSFs for Agreement Analysis 
Critical success factor 
G0 G1 G2 G3 
M R M R M R M R 
Receivable of underlying assets (user 
payment, government payment, or 
viability gap funding) 
4.23 6 4.57 2 4.41 6 4.40 4 
Sector of underlying assets (water, power, 
toll fee)  
3.94 7 4.00 7 4.00 7 3.80 8 
Strong private consortium  4.34 4 4.23 5 4.56 4 4.10 6 
The stability of future cash flows from the 
PPP project 
4.54 3 4.73 1 4.79 1 4.70 3 
Robust overall financial package of the 
project company 
3.94 8 3.77 8 3.94 8 4.00 7 
Reasonable risk allocation and clear 
responsibilities in PPP arrangement 
4.57 2 4.37 4 4.71 2 4.70 2 
Government’s willingness and capability 
to support the project and fulfill the 
agreement 
4.66 1 4.47 3 4.68 3 4.75 1 
Reliable PPP Infrastructure service 4.31 5 4.20 6 4.56 4 4.40 4 
Table 28 Agreement Analysis for Product Level-PPP CSFs 
 
RAF 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫ PD PA 
G0&G1 1.50 4.00 38% 63% 
G0&G2 0.63 4.00 16% 84% 
G0&G3 0.88 4.00 22% 78% 
G1&G2 1.13 4.00 28% 72% 
G1&G3 1.63 4.00 41% 59% 
G2&G3 1.25 4.00 31% 69% 
The RAFs, 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫s, and PAs for Product Level-ABS CSFs are shown in Tables 
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29 and 30. Experts show potential disagreement on the order of Product Level-ABS 
CSFs from V18 to V25. The PA01 (50%), the PA02 (67%), the PA03 (50%), the PA13 
(58%), and the PA23 (50%) pass the criteria of 50%, which indicates moderate 
agreement between these groups. However, the PA12 (42%) indicates that opinions 
between PPP and ABS communities disagree from each other.  
Table 29 Mean and Rank of Product Level- ABS CSFs for Agreement Analysis 
Critical success factor 
G0 G1 G2 G3 
M R M R M R M R 
Stage of underlying project at issuance and 
maturity of ABS product  
4.00 6 4.37 3 4.18 6 4.30 5 
Proper risk reallocation after securitization 3.97 7 4.30 4 4.24 5 4.30 4 
Bankruptcy remoteness effect due to 
securitization 
4.37 2 4.50 2 4.32 4 4.50 2 
Trustee’s expertise in infrastructure 
projects 
4.06 5 4.10 6 4.12 7 3.60 7 
Cash flows management during lifetime of 
ABS product 
4.14 4 3.90 7 4.68 2 3.90 6 
Relief responses when default happens 4.40 1 4.53 1 4.74 1 4.40 3 
Transfer and delivery of underlying asset 4.34 3 4.20 5 4.62 3 4.50 1 
Table 30 Agreement Analysis for Product Level-ABS CSFs 
 
RAF 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫ PD PA 
G0&G1 1.71 3.43 50% 50% 
G0&G2 1.14 3.43 33% 67% 
G0&G3 1.71 3.43 50% 50% 
G1&G2 2.00 3.43 58% 42% 
G1&G3 1.43 3.43 42% 58% 
G2&G3 1.71 3.43 50% 50% 
According to the results of agreement analysis, experts from diverse industries 
have general agreement on the order of most CSFs, except for the Product level-ABS 
CSFs between Group 1 and Group 2 (PPP and ABS communities). This finding will 
be discussed with further analysis of variance. 
 69 
4.6.2 ANOVA of CSFs 
To find the underlined reason for the disagreement, ANOVA is applied to dig into 
this issue and compare the opinion for each individual factor. Specifically, Least 
Significant Difference (LSD) is applied to perform all pair wise comparisons between 
group means. 
CSFs at Regulatory Level 
According to the result of ANOVA, experts from different industries show 
agreement on the significance of Regulatory Level CSFs from V1 to V5. This finding 
accords with the result of previous agreement analysis. That is to say, practitioners 
from PPP and ABS industry may not have significant disagreement on regulatory 
issues. Moreover, potential conflict during corporation may not exist in the regulatory 
level. 









framework for PPP 
Between 
Groups 
1.132 3 .377 2.139 .099 
Within 
Groups 
20.280 115 .176 
  
Total 21.412 118 
   
V2-Clear regulatory body 
and coordination mechanism 
for such financial instrument 
Between 
Groups 
.559 3 .186 .412 .745 
Within 
Groups 
52.079 115 .453 
  
Total 52.639 118 
   
V3-Open and transparent 




.159 3 .053 .151 .929 




Total 40.286 118 
   
V4-Relevant tax standards 
Between 
Groups 
1.082 3 .361 .792 .500 
Within 
Groups 
52.313 115 .455 
  
Total 53.395 118 





4.535 3 1.512 2.123 .101 
Within 
Groups 
81.902 115 .712 
  
Total 86.437 118 
   
CSFs at Market Level 
Similarly, according to the result of ANOVA, experts from different industries 
show agreement on significance of Market Level CSFs from V6 to V10. This result 
also validates the finding of the previous agreement analysis. That is to say, 
practitioners from PPP and ABS industry maintain a common view on market level 
issues and may not have significant disagreement. Accordingly, potential conflict 
during corporation in the future may not exist in the market level. Therefore, efforts 
should focus on the product level issues. 












.435 3 .145 .346 .792 
Within 
Groups 
48.120 115 .418 
  
Total 48.555 118 
   
V7-Objective and 
accurate credit rating 
Between 
Groups 
.501 3 .167 .363 .780 
Within 
Groups 
52.961 115 .461 
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Total 53.462 118 
   
V8- Accurate pricing 




1.066 3 .355 .756 .521 
Within 
Groups 
54.044 115 .470 
  
Total 55.109 118 
   




1.918 3 .639 1.008 .392 
Within 
Groups 
72.956 115 .634 
  
Total 74.874 118 
   
V10- Market access 




1.829 3 .610 1.437 .236 
Within 
Groups 
48.810 115 .424 
  
Total 50.639 118 
   
CSFs at Product Level-PPP 
In accordance with the result of ANOVA, experts from different industries show 
agreement on significance of Product Level-PPP CSFs from V11 to V18. This result 
also validates the finding of the previous agreement analysis. That is to say, 
practitioners from PPP and ABS industry maintain a common view on PPP issues and 
may not have significant disagreement. Accordingly, potential conflict during 
corporation may not exist in the product-PPP level.  





Square F Sig. 
V11- Receivable of 
underlying assets (user 
payment, government 




1.864 3 .621 .909 .439 
Within 
Groups 
78.573 115 .683 
  
Total 80.437 118 
   
V12- Sector of underlying 
assets (water, power, toll fee) 
Between 
Groups 




123.086 115 1.070 
  
Total 123.697 118 
   




3.120 3 1.040 2.012 .116 
Within 
Groups 
59.435 115 .517 
  
Total 62.555 118 
   
V14- The stability of future 




1.185 3 .395 1.251 .295 
Within 
Groups 
36.311 115 .316 
  
Total 37.496 118 
   
V15- Robust overall financial 




.848 3 .283 .411 .745 
Within 
Groups 
79.135 115 .688 
  
Total 79.983 118 
   
V16- Reasonable risk 
allocation and clear 




2.195 3 .732 1.966 .123 
Within 
Groups 
42.797 115 .372 
  
Total 44.992 118 
   
V17- Government’s 
willingness and capability to 




1.188 3 .396 .938 .425 
Within 
Groups 
48.544 115 .422 
  
Total 49.731 118 
   




2.206 3 .735 1.470 .226 
Within 
Groups 
57.525 115 .500 
  
Total 59.731 118 
   
CSFs at Product Level-ABS 
According to the result of ANOVA, experts show agreement on significance of 
Product Level-ABS CSFs, except for V23-Cash flows management during lifetime of 
ABS product. This result identifies the key disagreement and explains the finding of 
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the previous agreement analysis. 








V19-Stage of underlined 
project at issuance and 
maturity of ABS product 
Between 
Groups 
2.447 3 .816 1.560 .203 
Within 
Groups 
60.108 115 .523 
  
Total 62.555 118 
   




2.344 3 .781 1.413 .243 
Within 
Groups 
63.589 115 .553 
  
Total 65.933 118 
   
V21- Bankruptcy 




.711 3 .237 .439 .726 
Within 
Groups 
62.113 115 .540 
  
Total 62.824 118 
   
V22- Underwriter and 




4.076 3 1.359 1.682 .175 
Within 
Groups 
92.915 115 .808 
  
Total 96.992 118 
   
V23-Cash flows 
management during lifetime 
of ABS product 
Between 
Groups 
12.328 3 4.109 7.136 .000 
Within 
Groups 
66.227 115 .576 
  
Total 78.555 118 
   




2.363 3 .788 1.581 .198 
Within 
Groups 
57.284 115 .498 
  
Total 59.647 118 
   
V25-Transfer and delivery 
of underlined asset 
Between 
Groups 
3.108 3 1.036 1.813 .149 
Within 
Groups 
65.715 115 .571 
  
Total 68.824 118 
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To dig deeper into this finding, pair wise comparison among the four groups is 
performed. It can be found that disagreement happens between Group 0 and Group 2, 
Group 1 and Group 2, as well as Group 3 and Group 2. In addition, the positive mean 
difference shows that, ABS experts believe “Cash flows management during lifetime 
of ABS product” is more critical compared to all other experts. 
Obviously, PPP experts understand the mechanism of using a special bank 
account to treat the cash flows in theory, so they generally believe that cash flows 
management will not be an important issue during the lifetime of ABS product. 
However, ABS experts who have more practical experience reveal that this is still a 
critical issue even a special bank account is adopted.  
What needs to be mentioned here is the default case study that helps identify this 
critical factor of cash flow, the default of Dachengxi Yellow River Bridge Toll ABS. 
In this case, original asset owners themselves usually are responsible for collecting 
cash flows of underlying assets in China, rather than third-party institutions. The 
consolidation and allocation of cash flows during the lifetime of ABS products is 
partially responsible for the default scenario. This event of default is well known in 
the ABS industry in China, which obviously enhance the practitioners’ concern for 
such risk. Therefore, this critical factor should be emphasized to the practitioners in 
the PPP industry during the planning phase of ABS financing, as it could be a blind 
spot of the PPP community. 
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1 .243 .189 .201 -.13 .62 
2 -.534 .183 .004 -.90 -.17 
3 .243 .213 .256 -.18 .66 
1 
0 -.243 .189 .201 -.62 .13 
2 -.776 .190 .000 -1.15 -.40 
3 .000 .219 1.000 -.43 .43 
2 
0 .534 .183 .004 .17 .90 
1 .776 .190 .000 .40 1.15 
3 .776 .214 .000 .35 1.20 
3 
0 -.243 .213 .256 -.66 .18 
1 .000 .219 1.000 -.43 .43 
2 -.776 .214 .000 -1.20 -.35 
4.6.3 Opinion on Suitable Assets and Investors 
The RAFs, 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫s, and PAs for suitable assets are shown in Tables 36 and 37. 
It can be seen that the PAs are 100%. Therefore, there is a perfect agreement in the 
ranking between the PPP and ABS communities on suitable receivables. Experts agree 
that PPP projects with revenue from user payment are the most suitable assets to be 
securitized, followed by Viability gap funding. PPP projects with revenue from 
government payment are the least suitable for ABS financing.  
Table 36 Mean and Rank of Suitable Assets for Agreement Analysis 
Suitable Assets 
G0 G1 G2 G3 
M R M R M R M R 
User payment 4.29 1 4.23 1 4.29 1 4.00 1 
Viability gap funding 3.97 2 3.70 2 3.94 2 3.90 2 
Government payment 3.46 3 3.10 3 3.38 3 3.80 3 
 
 76 
Table 37 Agreement Analysis for Suitable Assets 
 
RAF 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫ PD PA 
G0&G1 0.00 1.33 0% 100% 
G0&G2 0.00 1.33 0% 100% 
G0&G3 0.00 1.33 0% 100% 
G1&G2 0.00 1.33 0% 100% 
G1&G3 0.00 1.33 0% 100% 
G2&G3 0.00 1.33 0% 100% 
According to the result of ANOVA, experts from different industries show 
agreement on significance of suitable underlined assets. This result also accords with 
the finding of the agreement analysis. It means that practitioners from PPP and ABS 
industry maintain a common view on what receivables are suitable to serve as 
underlined assets. Both communities prefer the project’s receivables from user 
payment for securitization rather than government payment.  











1.306 3 .435 .483 .695 
Within 
Groups 
103.568 115 .901 
  
Total 104.874 118 





1.399 3 .466 .826 .482 
Within 
Groups 
64.954 115 .565 
  
Total 66.353 118 





6.024 3 2.008 1.642 .184 
Within 
Groups 
140.615 115 1.223 
  
Total 146.639 118 
   
The RAFs, 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫s, and PAs for suitable investors are shown in Tables 39 and 
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40. Experts show potential disagreement on the order of suitable investors for 
PPPABS. The PA02 (69%), the PA13 (75%), and the PA23 (56%) pass the agreement 
criteria of 50%, which indicates moderate agreement between these groups. However, 
the PA01 (38%), the PA03 (44%), and the PA12 (44%) indicate that opinions between 
PPP and ABS communities disagree from each other. 
Table 39 Mean and Rank of Suitable Investors for Agreement Analysis 
G0 G1 G2 G3 
 
M R M R M R M R 
Commercial Banks 4.03 3 3.53 7 4.26 1 3.65 3 
Insurance companies 4.11 2 3.93 1 4.18 2 4.00 1 
Pension funds 3.94 5 3.93 2 3.79 4 3.95 2 
Proprietary trading of Investment Banks 3.57 8 3.60 5 3.68 7 3.40 5 
Trust company 3.89 6 3.83 3 3.71 6 3.60 4 
Finance/Investment business of 
corporations 
4.14 1 3.70 4 3.74 5 3.30 7 
Mutual funds 4.00 4 3.57 6 4.09 3 3.40 6 
Hedge funds 3.71 7 3.33 8 3.53 8 2.90 8 
Table 40 Agreement Analysis for Suitable Investors 
 
RAF 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫ PD PA 
G0&G1 2.50 4.00 63% 38% 
G0&G2 1.25 4.00 31% 69% 
G0&G3 2.25 4.00 56% 44% 
G1&G2 2.25 4.00 56% 44% 
G1&G3 1.00 4.00 25% 75% 
G2&G3 1.75 4.00 44% 56% 











10.377 3 3.459 4.541 .005 
Within 
Groups 
87.606 115 .762 
  
Total 97.983 118 





1.111 3 .370 .505 .680 
Within 
Groups 
84.351 115 .733 
  
Total 85.462 118 




.529 3 .176 .163 .921 
Within 
Groups 
124.261 115 1.081 
  
Total 124.790 118 
   




.979 3 .326 .308 .820 
Within 
Groups 
122.013 115 1.061 
  
Total 122.992 118 




1.306 3 .435 .441 .724 
Within 
Groups 
113.568 115 .988 
  
Total 114.874 118 
   
Finance/Investment 
business of corporations 
Between 
Groups 
9.471 3 3.157 3.201 .056 
Within 
Groups 
113.403 115 .986 
  
Total 122.874 118 




9.031 3 3.010 3.572 .056 
Within 
Groups 
96.902 115 .843 
  
Total 105.933 118 




9.063 3 3.021 2.019 .115 
Within 
Groups 
172.080 115 1.496 
  
Total 181.143 118 
   
Then ANOVA is applied to look into this issue (Table 41). This result indicates 
that experts have disagreements on the suitability for commercial banks to invest in 
PPPABS products. To dig deeper into this issue, pair wise comparison among the four 
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groups is performed. It can be found that, disagreement happens between Group 0 and 
Group 1, Group 1 and Group 2, as well as Group 2 and Group 3.  
Specifically, compared to PPP experts, ABS experts believe that commercial 
banks are suitable to invest in PPPABS products. The underlined reason of this 
phenomenon is related to the ABS practice in China. Since major commercial banks 
in China are state-owned corporations who actively participate in full range of 
financial activities on the market, the practitioners are used to have major commercial 
banks as investor of ABS products in practice. In the mean time, PPP experts are not 
familiar with this situation and believe commercial banks are not very suitable for 
long-term PPPABS tranches as assumed in theory. It explains the difference of 
understanding between PPP and ABS experts regarding this issue. However, it may 
not introduce potential conflicts during future cooperation between the two 
communities because it is the difference between the theory and practice.  
It is obvious that experts from both sides understand that commercial banks in 
theory are not suitable for long-term investment due to their ALM requirement. 
However, in practice, PPP practitioners in China will learn about this situation soon as 
they use the ABS market for financing. In addition, ABS products are usually 
designed with different maturities. Commercial banks are still very suitable for 


























1 .495 .217 .024 .07 .93 
2 -.236 .210 .264 -.65 .18 
3 .379 .245 .125 -.11 .86 
1 
0 -.495 .217 .024 -.93 -.07 
2 -.731 .219 .001 -1.16 -.30 
3 -.117 .252 .644 -.62 .38 
2 
0 .236 .210 .264 -.18 .65 
1 .731 .219 .001 .30 1.16 
3 .615 .246 .014 .13 1.10 
3 
0 -.379 .245 .125 -.86 .11 
1 .117 .252 .644 -.38 .62 




5 CHAPTER FIVE: Feasibility Assessment Framework of PPPABS 
The assessment of feasibility of ABS financing for PPP infrastructure projects 
remains an uncharted area in both academia and industry. To understand how can 
practitioners evaluate such financing potential and make decision on whether apply 
ABS financing during the planning phase, an empirical study is conducted, and a list 
of 25 critical success factors is derived. In this chapter, Principal Component Analysis 
is adopted to further analyze the survey data. The aim of the analysis is to reduce the 
dimensions of the model and derive a simpler and more robust feasibility assessment 
framework for PPPABS financing. 
5.1 Principle Component Analysis 
To establish an easily interpreted assessment model for PPPABS financing, 
factor analysis is used to extract the principal components from the 25 CSFs. This 
methodology has been widely explored in the literature to reduce the dimensions of 
the model (Brown 2014; Jolliffe 1986; O'Rourke and Hatcher 2013). Therefore, factor 
analysis was applied in this paper to further examine the data. Principal component 
analysis (PCA) is used because the aim of the analysis is to identify underlying 
dimensions with multiple variables. 
A preliminary examination is needed to test whether the data is appropriate for 
factor analysis (Jolliffe 1986). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic is used to 
measure sampling adequacy, which ranges between 0 and 1 (Gorsuch 1983). A KMO 
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value close to 0 shows that PCA method is inappropriate, while a KMO value close to 
1 indicates compact patterns of correlation and thus data is suitable for PCA (Gorsuch 
1983) (Kline 2014). Gorsuch (1983), Child (1990), and Kline (2014) state that a KMO 
value of more than 0.5 is regarded as adequate. According to the KMO analysis for 
the survey data, the KMO measure is 0.76, so data is proved to be suitable for 
principal component analysis. Bartlett’s Test of sphericity is applied to assess 
potential relations (Field 2005). As the significant level is far smaller than 0.05, data 
is also supported to apply principal component analysis.  
Table 43 KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .760 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1750.050 
df 300 
Sig. .000 
The correlation matrix (Table 44) shows an overview of association among 
critical success factors. Based on the assumption that correlations result from the 
CSFs sharing common underlying components, highly correlated CSFs are likely 
influenced by the same components (Badu et al. 2012; Field 2005). For instance, the 
correlation coefficient between V19 (Stage of the underlying project at issuance and 
maturity of ABS product) and V20 (Proper risk reallocation after securitization) is 
0.806. An assumption can be made that a common underlying component exists to 
influence both factors, as these two factors are both related to ABS issuance in 
practice. Moving forward, the correlation coefficient between V19 (Stage of the 
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underlying project at issuance and maturity of ABS product) and V23 (Cash flows 
management during the lifetime of ABS product) is 0.758, which indicates V23 might 
also be influenced by the same component. Although V23 does not concern the 
issuance of ABS product, it expands the scope of the component to incorporate the 
lifetime management of ABS product. Therefore, this component can be assumed to 
describe the overall ABS financing techniques. Similarly, other strong correlations 
also imply that different underlying components may exist. 




Table 44 Correlation Matrix 
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 V24 V25 
V1 1.00  -0.01  0.07  0.16  0.16  0.11  0.29  0.22  0.07  0.16  0.22  0.23  0.34  0.54  0.28  0.65  0.51  0.49  0.28  0.30  0.29  0.20  0.39  0.30  0.30  
V2 -0.01  1.00  0.25  0.25  0.19  0.57  0.28  0.20  0.28  0.24  -0.08  -0.08  0.09  0.05  0.18  0.08  -0.13  0.05  0.04  0.07  0.07  0.01  0.06  0.01  0.08  
V3 0.07  0.25  1.00  0.63  0.37  0.08  0.19  0.15  0.10  0.61  0.01  0.02  0.09  0.09  0.03  0.06  -0.10  0.17  0.05  0.06  0.12  -0.01  0.04  -0.02  0.30  
V4 0.16  0.25  0.63  1.00  0.79  0.11  0.19  0.20  0.20  0.84  -0.01  0.06  0.12  0.08  0.15  0.13  -0.07  0.26  0.08  0.12  0.12  -0.01  0.12  0.05  0.30  
V5 0.16  0.19  0.37  0.79  1.00  0.16  0.25  0.26  0.28  0.80  -0.08  0.00  0.23  0.09  0.21  0.04  -0.15  0.21  0.02  0.03  0.08  0.19  0.11  0.06  0.27  
V6 0.11  0.57  0.08  0.11  0.16  1.00  0.52  0.47  0.49  0.12  0.14  0.03  0.10  0.11  0.10  0.00  -0.02  0.03  0.12  0.13  0.14  0.11  0.18  0.17  0.09  
V7 0.29  0.28  0.19  0.19  0.25  0.52  1.00  0.52  0.60  0.20  0.00  0.03  0.25  0.33  0.18  0.18  0.00  0.19  0.26  0.23  0.20  0.12  0.31  0.17  0.24  
V8 0.22  0.20  0.15  0.20  0.26  0.47  0.52  1.00  0.57  0.22  0.12  0.02  0.22  0.14  0.20  0.18  0.10  0.26  0.24  0.22  0.16  0.24  0.23  0.10  0.15  
V9 0.07  0.28  0.10  0.20  0.28  0.49  0.60  0.57  1.00  0.20  0.05  0.03  0.25  0.22  0.17  0.11  -0.01  0.15  0.29  0.18  0.21  0.25  0.17  0.00  -0.01  
V10 0.16  0.24  0.61  0.84  0.80  0.12  0.20  0.22  0.20  1.00  -0.09  0.04  0.23  0.04  0.16  0.07  -0.08  0.22  0.00  0.07  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.03  0.26  
V11 0.22  -0.08  0.01  -0.01  -0.08  0.14  0.00  0.12  0.05  -0.09  1.00  0.54  0.28  0.14  0.33  0.20  0.21  0.17  0.32  0.24  0.25  0.24  0.27  0.28  0.20  
V12 0.23  -0.08  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.54  1.00  0.22  0.21  0.15  0.22  0.21  0.27  0.20  0.15  0.13  0.17  0.09  0.07  0.18  
V13 0.34  0.09  0.09  0.12  0.23  0.10  0.25  0.22  0.25  0.23  0.28  0.22  1.00  0.26  0.58  0.30  0.16  0.40  0.32  0.21  0.25  0.66  0.30  0.14  0.31  
V14 0.54  0.05  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.11  0.33  0.14  0.22  0.04  0.14  0.21  0.26  1.00  0.21  0.64  0.33  0.44  0.31  0.26  0.33  0.10  0.44  0.39  0.38  
V15 0.28  0.18  0.03  0.15  0.21  0.10  0.18  0.20  0.17  0.16  0.33  0.15  0.58  0.21  1.00  0.32  0.17  0.33  0.27  0.22  0.15  0.41  0.30  0.19  0.30  
V16 0.65  0.08  0.06  0.13  0.04  0.00  0.18  0.18  0.11  0.07  0.20  0.22  0.30  0.64  0.32  1.00  0.58  0.70  0.35  0.37  0.24  0.13  0.41  0.32  0.32  
V17 0.51  -0.13  -0.10  -0.07  -0.15  -0.02  0.00  0.10  -0.01  -0.08  0.21  0.21  0.16  0.33  0.17  0.58  1.00  0.30  0.21  0.19  0.09  0.11  0.19  0.23  0.14  
V18 0.49  0.05  0.17  0.26  0.21  0.03  0.19  0.26  0.15  0.22  0.17  0.27  0.40  0.44  0.33  0.70  0.30  1.00  0.25  0.30  0.21  0.24  0.35  0.25  0.34  
V19 0.28  0.04  0.05  0.08  0.02  0.12  0.26  0.24  0.29  0.00  0.32  0.20  0.32  0.31  0.27  0.35  0.21  0.25  1.00  0.81  0.74  0.29  0.76  0.31  0.31  
V20 0.30  0.07  0.06  0.12  0.03  0.13  0.23  0.22  0.18  0.07  0.24  0.15  0.21  0.26  0.22  0.37  0.19  0.30  0.81  1.00  0.51  0.21  0.71  0.28  0.30  
V21 0.29  0.07  0.12  0.12  0.08  0.14  0.20  0.16  0.21  0.06  0.25  0.13  0.25  0.33  0.15  0.24  0.09  0.21  0.74  0.51  1.00  0.25  0.72  0.38  0.33  
V22 0.20  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.19  0.11  0.12  0.24  0.25  0.08  0.24  0.17  0.66  0.10  0.41  0.13  0.11  0.24  0.29  0.21  0.25  1.00  0.25  0.09  0.25  
V23 0.39  0.06  0.04  0.12  0.11  0.18  0.31  0.23  0.17  0.06  0.27  0.09  0.30  0.44  0.30  0.41  0.19  0.35  0.76  0.71  0.72  0.25  1.00  0.61  0.55  
V24 0.30  0.01  -0.02  0.05  0.06  0.17  0.17  0.10  0.00  0.03  0.28  0.07  0.14  0.39  0.19  0.32  0.23  0.25  0.31  0.28  0.38  0.09  0.61  1.00  0.53  
V25 0.30  0.08  0.30  0.30  0.27  0.09  0.24  0.15  -0.01  0.26  0.20  0.18  0.31  0.38  0.30  0.32  0.14  0.34  0.31  0.30  0.33  0.25  0.55  0.53  1.00  
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Extraction of underlying components 
The next step is to extract the latent components of successful PPPABS financing. 
After a careful examination of models from 3 principal components to 10 principal 
components, the 5 components model hits the sweet spot between conciseness and 
comprehensiveness. The analysis indicates that the first 5 principal components can 
explain 62.9% of the total matrix variance. Observation on proportions of variance 
explained can also be made: Component 1 (14.6%), Component 2 (13.2%), Component 3 
(12.9%), Component 4 (11.8%), and Component 5 (10.5%). In addition, the scree plot in 
Figure 11 also suggests that the first 5 components are significant when explaining the 
total variance, with all eigenvalues of 5 components larger than 1 (Field 2005). This 
result helps us identify the 5 major underlying components by reducing the dimensions of 
the model. 
Table 45 Total Variance Explained 
 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of Var. Cum. % Total 
% of 
Var. Cum.% Total 
% of 
Var. Cum. % 
1 6.588 26.354 26.354 6.588 26.354 26.354 3.658 14.633 14.633 
2 3.387 13.550 39.903 3.387 13.550 39.903 3.292 13.167 27.799 
3 2.221 8.883 48.787 2.221 8.883 48.787 3.223 12.893 40.692 
4 1.841 7.362 56.149 1.841 7.362 56.149 2.941 11.766 52.458 
5 1.690 6.760 62.909 1.690 6.760 62.909 2.613 10.451 62.909 
6 1.202 4.807 67.715             
7 1.138 4.553 72.269             
8 .934 3.737 76.005             
9 .767 3.066 79.072             
10 .672 2.688 81.759             
11 .644 2.575 84.335             
12 .579 2.315 86.649             
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13 .528 2.112 88.761             
14 .477 1.908 90.669             
15 .382 1.527 92.196             
16 .366 1.463 93.660             
17 .290 1.161 94.820             
18 .256 1.023 95.843             
19 .249 .994 96.838             
20 .201 .802 97.640             
21 .140 .559 98.198             
22 .133 .533 98.731             
23 .125 .501 99.232             
24 .108 .432 99.665             




Figure 12 Scree Plot of Principal Component Analysis 
Rotated solutions are preferable to interpret PCA results (Kline 2014). The rotated 
component matrix generated further reveals the nature of the principal components. 
 85 
According to the matrix, all components have more than one variable loading on them. 
Therefore, all 5 components should be kept for further interpretation and model 
construction (Field 2005; Kline 2014). After critical assessing factors, loadings, and 
relationships under each component, the following interpretation can be made to define 
the 5 principal components: Component 1 is labeled “Effective ABS issuance and 
lifetime management”, Component 2 is labeled “Clear regulatory guidance”, Component 
3 is labeled “Robust PPP and concessional arrangements”, Component 4 is labeled 
“Supportive capital market conditions”, Component 5 is labeled “Reliable underlying 
asset quality”. 
Table 46 Rotated Component Matrix 
Critical success factor C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
Cash flows management during the lifetime of 
ABS product .885     
Stage of the underlying project at issuance and 
maturity of ABS product .839     
Bankruptcy remoteness effect due to 
securitization .813     
Proper risk reallocation after securitization .760     Relief responses when default happens .568     Transfer and delivery of underlying asset .490     Market access threshold release to more 
investors  .916    
Relevant tax standards  .915    Relevant accounting standards  .826    Open and transparent approval process and 
information disclosure  .729    
Reasonable risk allocation and clear 
responsibilities in PPP arrangement   .869   
Developed legal framework for PPP   .752   Government’s willingness and capability to 
support the project and fulfill the agreement   .705   
The stability of future cash flows from the PPP 
project   .699   
Reliable PPP Infrastructure service   .655   
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Mature and effective capital market    .805  Active and liquid secondary market    .797  Objective and accurate credit rating    .752  Accurate pricing based on market conditions    .697  Clear regulatory body and coordination 
mechanism for such financial instrument    .573  
Strong private consortium      .785 Underwriter and trustee’s expertise in 
infrastructure projects     .784 
Robust overall financial package of the project 
company     .653 
Receivable of underlying assets (user payment, 
government payment, or viability gap funding)     .563 
Sector of underlying assets (water, power, toll 
fee, etc.)     .474 
 
5.2 Assessment Framework 
Component 1 - Effective ABS issuance and lifetime management 
Principal component 1, effective ABS issuance and lifetime management, represents 
the core financial technique in such a financing mechanism, which requires all capital 
market participants during the ABS lifecycle dedicated to providing professional, 
accountable, and sustainable services with their expertise and experience. Component 1 
accounts for 14.6% of the total variance, and has 6 factors loading onto it: Cash flows 
management during the lifetime of ABS product (88.5%), Stage of the underlying project 
at issuance and maturity of ABS product (83.9%), Bankruptcy remoteness effect due to 
securitization (81.3%), Proper risk reallocation after securitization (76.0%), Relief 
responses when default happens (56.8%), and Transfer and delivery of underlying asset 
(49.0%). 
PPP infrastructure projects at different stages, such as the construction phase and the 
operation phase, show vastly different risk and return profiles, which then affects the 
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credit rating and pricing of ABS product at issuance (Ke et al. 2010). Therefore, the stage 
of the underlying PPP project needs to be considered in advance of structuring ABS 
finance. Theoretically, risk allocation among participants of the project will change 
because ABS investors, as the new financing source, will also take partial risks along 
with the return. A proper reallocation of risks cannot be ensured without professional 
credit rating service and pricing capability of the capital market participants. Bankruptcy 
remoteness is an important characteristic of ABS product to institutional investors. 
Project companies are usually special purpose companies for specific infrastructure 
projects without much credit history. If project companies serve as the issuer of ABS 
product, investors of ABS products will be exposed to such credit risks. By using a 
special purpose vehicle as the issuer, default risk of the project company will be detached 
from the PPPABS product. 
Although objective assessment of credit performance and credit enhancement gives 
investors a solid understanding of the investment vehicle, there are still chances that 
default scenarios may happen. In this case, proper relief responses when default happens 
become the last firewall to protect investors. Quick and professional response need to be 
discussed during the planning phase of ABS financing. Real transfer and delivery of 
underlying asset, for instance, the concession of PPP infrastructure project, is discussed 
as the key to take advantage of bankruptcy remoteness and out balance sheet financing of 
ABS instrument. The underlying asset needs to be transferred and maintained after 
issuance within the domestic legal framework. Cash flows management during the 
lifetime of ABS product is a fundamental routine duty of an ABS financing. It serves as 
the channel to flow receivables collected from the infrastructure project to the investment 
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vehicle and, finally, the institutional investors. Any breaks in the chain may lead to 
default scenarios. 
ABS issuance settles the long-term risk reallocation, financing cost, cash flow 
management rules of the project all at once. The assessment of PPPABS financing does 
not end after launch. Lifetime management of the ABS product requires full attention by 
all participants so as to achieve sustainable PPP infrastructure financing (Badu et al. 
2012). Therefore, effective ABS issuance and lifetime management are considered as an 
organic whole when assessing successful ABS financing. 
Component 2 – Clear regulatory guidance 
Principal component 2, clear regulatory guidance, defines the general regulations for 
both PPP and ABS industry, especially the new financing instrument from the relevant 
public authorities. Component 2 accounts for 13.2% of the total variance, and has 4 
factors loading onto it: Market access threshold release to more investors (91.6%), 
Relevant tax standards (91.5%), Relevant accounting standards (82.6%), and Open and 
transparent approval process and information disclosure (72.9%). 
Relevant tax and accounting standards were highly recommended to be incorporated 
into the list of CSFs by experts during the interview session. Well-structured tax and 
accounting standards will improve the transparency and credibility of the financial status 
of PPP project and, in turn, the ABS product. “Open and transparent approval process 
and information disclosure” is considered as another key issue to the investors of 
PPPABS. Competition among consortiums under a transparent process will increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the project, which will lead to a successful PPP in the end 
(Chan et al. 2010; Li et al. 2005). Any lack of information disclosure may cause 
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asymmetric information among all participants as well as harm the partnership and 
confidence of the investors (Ke et al. 2010).  
Regulatory guidance is considered to be another major component of successful 
PPPABS financing, especially due to the pilot nature of this financing innovation. 
Participants on the market will hesitate to enter this area without clear regulations on this 
specific interdisciplinary field. 
Component 3 - Robust PPP and concessional arrangements 
Principal component 3, robust PPP and concessional arrangements, represents the 
reasonable contractual framework of PPP and concession, especially regarding risk 
sharing, legal obligation, and infrastructure service control. Component 3 accounts for 
12.9% of the total variance, and has 5 factors loading onto it: Reasonable risk allocation 
and clear responsibilities in PPP arrangement (86.9%), Developed legal framework for 
PPP (75.2%), Government’s willingness and capability to support the project and fulfill 
the agreement (70.5%), The stability of future cash flows from the PPP project (69.9%), 
and Reliable PPP Infrastructure service (65.5%).  
Reasonable risk allocation and clear responsibilities have been discussed in-depth 
among PPP researchers as one of the fundamental concerns in the PPP framework to 
achieve overall risk mitigation and effectiveness enhancement by allocating risks and 
responsibilities to suitable participants (Chan et al. 2010; Meng et al. 2011; Zhang 2005). 
Accordingly, a well-developed legal system for PPP arrangement will substantially affect 
the execution of the responsibilities under the partnership (Dulaimi et al. 2010; Li et al. 
2005). Under the umbrella of PPP legislation, the government’s willingness and 
capability to support the project is considered critical since private partners will be 
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exposed to tremendous political uncertainties without consistent public support (Ke et al. 
2010) (Chan et al. 2011). Reliable infrastructure service delivery refers to the quality of 
infrastructure asset operation when fulfilling the requirements of concession. This 
characteristic of a specific PPP project is usually required by the government to meet a 
certain level of performance to the public. Furthermore, reliable infrastructure service 
will contribute to stable future cash flows generated from the project, which is considered 
the cornerstone to robust financing. 
Characteristics of PPP arrangement represent the foundation of a successful PPP 
project financing. Within the context of PPPABS, these characteristics are still primary 
concerns of the capital market counterparties. Therefore, all above-mentioned factors 
intertwined with each other to serve as a critical component of successful PPPABS 
financing. 
Component 4 – Supportive capital market conditions 
Principal component 4, supportive capital market conditions, describes the 
availability and effectiveness of the macro capital market of the host country. Component 
4 accounts for 11.8% of the total variance, and has 5 factors loading onto it: Mature and 
effective capital market (80.5%), Active and liquid secondary market (79.7%), Objective 
and accurate credit rating (75.2%), Accurate pricing based on market conditions (69.7%), 
and Clear regulatory body and coordination mechanism for such financial instrument 
(57.3%). 
A mature and effective capital market is crucial to PPPABS financing with regards 
to financing sources, professionalism, and cost-effectiveness. As a financial derivative 
product, ABS will not be a feasible financing solution if the capital market is unavailable. 
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During the lifetime of ABS product, active and liquid secondary market is also favored 
by institutional investors as a result of their liquidity concern (CFA Institute 2017). 
Investors will pay liquidity premium if the secondary market is inactive while selling 
PPPABS products. Likewise, objective and accurate credit rating is essential both at 
launch and during the lifetime of ABS (Lam et al. 2011). It serves as the fundamental 
assessment of the fixed-income financing instrument and thus essential to the success of 
PPPABS. In the end, a clear regulatory body and coordination mechanism for such a 
fresh financial instrument is desired by all above-mentioned capital market participants, 
such as institutional investors, investment banks, and credit rating agencies. 
The capital market environment is concluded as a key determinant of alternative 
financing for infrastructure projects (Jefferies 2006; Li et al. 2005; Ozdoganm and Talat 
Birgonul 2000). Development banks regularly assess the capital market environment of 
their clients, developing countries, to evaluate financing instruments and potential during 
the project planning phase. Therefore, capital market condition undeniably plays an 
important role while performing the preliminary assessment. 
Component 5 - Reliable underlying asset quality 
Principal component 5, reliable underlying asset quality, defines the nature of the 
infrastructure asset and strength of private participants who manage the asset. Component 
5 accounts for 10.5% of the total variance, and has 5 factors loading onto it: Strong 
private consortium (78.5%), Underwriter and trustee’s expertise in infrastructure (78.4%), 
Robust overall financial package of the project company (65.3%), Receivable of 
underlying assets (user payment, government payment, or viability gap funding) (56.3%) 
and Sector of underlying assets (water, power, toll fee, etc.) (47.4%). 
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Capital market participants’ expertise in infrastructure has been explained to be a 
major reason why institutional investors have not allocated a lot in infrastructure assets 
already (Inderst and Stewart 2014; Lam et al. 2011). According to many institutional 
investors during the interview, professional financial institutions with infrastructure 
project management knowledge and experience will tremendously enhance their 
confidence in such novel investment product. As large-scale infrastructure projects are 
very complicated, private sector institutions usually work together as a consortium to 
leverage their expertise. A strong private consortium can benefit the overall project 
quality and infrastructure service delivery, which is part of the foundation of a PPP 
investment (Dulaimi et al. 2010; Li et al. 2005; Tiong et al. 1992). Furthermore, a robust 
financial package of the project company also contributes to the sustainability of the 
project, the confidence of investors, and thus makes the deal-structuring more smooth 
(Tang and Shen 2013; Tiong et al. 1992). Receivables of underlying assets generally 
come from user payment, government payment, or viability gap funding. Marketability of 
PPP project determines whether the underlying asset can be self-financing or whether 
subsidy from the government is needed (Badu et al. 2012). The sector of the PPP 
infrastructure asset usually substantially affects many other key factors, such as public 
support, receivables, cash flows, and risk allocation. 
All above-mentioned factors combine to form the basic nature of the underlying 
asset and configure the last piece of assessment framework of PPPABS financing. The 
last component, underlying asset quality should also be argued as a fundamental one and 
emphasized in the framework. 
5.3 Assessment Index 
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These 5 principal components can be combined to build up an assessment 
framework for PPPABS financing. Practitioners in the industry may apply this 
framework for preliminary evaluation on considering PPPABS financing instrument for a 
specific infrastructure project. For example, a feasibility index can be calculated as 
follows for overall assessment and decision making. The weights allocated to 
















Wi is the weight assigned to the ith component of feasibility assessment framework; 
Fi is the ith component of feasibility assessment framework; 
F1: Effective ABS issuance and lifetime management 
F2: Clear regulatory guidance 
F3: Robust PPP and concessional arrangements 
F4: Supportive capital market conditions 
F5: Reliable underlying asset quality 
Vari is the variance explained by the ith component; 
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aij is the loading of the jth critical success factor on the ith component in the Rotated 
Component Matrix (Table 20); 
Vj is the quantitative rating of the jth critical success factor. 
5.4 Framework Application and Validation 
The first batch of PPPABS screening in China can be used to illustrate the 
application of the assessment framework. At the beginning of 2017, 41 projects were 
submitted to the National Development and Reform Commission of China as candidates 
for the pilot batch PPPABS. After a careful screening and valuation process, 9 PPP 
projects are recommended for ABS financing. 4 PPPABS were successfully launched 
later after appraisal by the Securities Regulatory Commission of China. 
The aim of this section is to demonstrate how practitioners may apply this 
assessment framework while considering PPPABS financing. A focus group of experts 
was conducted to rate these 41 PPP projects. First, an overall rating of the projects was 
given by the experts, scaling from 1 to 5. Furthermore, individual ratings for each 
principal component were discussed and assigned by experts, based on the proposed 
assessment framework. 2 ranks are then generated by 1. overall rating scores by experts; 
2. rating scores calculated by the assessment index formula.  
Agreement analysis method is adopted to compare these 2 ranks. Based on the work 
of Okpala and Aniekwu (1988), we apply rank agreement analysis to measure the 
agreement in the ranking for the pilot batch projects to be financed via PPPABS. The 
rank agreement factor (RAF) is defined as the average absolute difference in the ranking 
of the projects between two groups. The maximum rank agreement factor RAF୫ୟ୶ is the 
maximum possible RAF for N items. The percentage disagreement (PD) is defined as 
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RAF divided byRAF୫ୟ୶. The percentage agreement (PA) is defined as 1 minus PD 
(Zhang 2005). 












         PA = 1 − PD 
The result of agreement analysis shows in Table 48. The percentage agreement 
between the experts’ decision and the model’s decision is 75%. It means that experts’ 
intuitive assessment of the projects has 75% overlap with assessment and 
recommendation by the proposed framework, which can serve as a validation of the work. 
Feasibility index = 17% ∗ Fଵ + 23% ∗ Fଶ + 21% ∗ Fଷ + 20% ∗ Fସ + 19% ∗ Fହ 
Table 47 Rating for Agreement Analysis 
Project Sub-rating Overall rating Rank 
# Regulatory PPP CM Asset ABS Expert Index Expert Model Diff. 
1 4 4 3 5 4 4 3.98 5 10 5 
2 4 3 3 3 4 3 3.40 13 19 6 
3 4 3 2 2 4 2 3.01 29 29 0 
4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4.56 1 1 0 
5 4 3 3 3 3 2 3.23 29 25 4 
6 4 3 3 3 3 2 3.23 29 25 4 
7 4 4 3 3 4 3 3.61 13 14 1 
8 3 2 2 3 2 1 2.42 38 40 2 
9 3 2 2 3 2 1 2.42 38 40 2 
10 4 3 4 3 4 3 3.60 13 16 3 
11 4 3 3 4 3 3 3.42 13 18 5 
12 4 5 4 5 5 5 4.56 1 1 0 
13 3 3 4 4 3 3 3.39 13 23 10 
14 3 3 4 4 4 3 3.56 13 18 5 
15 3 3 4 3 4 3 3.37 13 22 9 
16 4 4 3 3 4 3 3.61 13 14 1 
17 4 4 5 5 5 5 4.56 1 3 2 
18 4 3 3 3 4 3 3.40 13 19 6 
19 3 2 3 3 3 2 2.79 29 36 7 
20 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.00 5 9 4 
21 3 2 4 4 2 3 3.02 13 31 18 
22 4 2 3 4 2 3 3.04 13 30 17 
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23 4 4 4 3 4 4 3.81 5 12 7 
24 4 4 4 5 4 4 4.19 5 7 2 
25 4 5 4 4 4 4 4.21 5 6 1 
26 4 4 5 5 5 5 4.56 1 3 2 
27 4 5 4 5 4 4 4.40 5 5 0 
28 3 2 3 3 2 1 2.62 38 39 1 
29 4 4 3 4 3 3 3.63 13 13 0 
30 3 2 4 3 2 2 2.83 29 35 6 
31 4 4 5 4 4 4 4.20 5 7 2 
32 4 4 3 5 4 3 3.98 13 10 3 
33 4 5 3 5 4 4 4.19 5 8 3 
34 4 3 3 3 3 3 3.23 13 25 12 
35 3 3 4 4 2 3 3.23 13 29 16 
36 4 3 3 3 4 3 3.40 13 19 6 
37 4 3 3 2 2 2 2.88 29 32 3 
38 3 3 3 2 2 1 2.65 38 38 0 
39 4 4 3 2 3 2 3.25 29 24 5 
40 4 3 3 2 2 2 2.88 29 32 3 
41 4 3 2 2 3 2 2.84 29 34 5 
Table 48 Agreement Analysis 
RAF 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫ PD PA 




6 CHAPTER SIX: Advanced Feasibility Assessment Model of PPPABS 
To understand how can practitioners evaluate such financing potential and make 
decision on whether apply ABS financing during the planning phase, a feasibility 
assessment check list of 25 critical success factors is derived. And a simplified model was 
achieved by reducing the dimensions to 5 principal components for PPP infrastructure 
ABS financing. 5 principal factors include “Effective ABS issuance and lifetime 
management”, “Clear regulatory guidance”, “Robust PPP and concessional 
arrangements”, “Supportive capital market conditions”, and “Reliable underlying asset 
quality”. Based on this finding, an assessment framework and index was constructed for 
PPPABS financing. The index was constructed based on an assumption that these 5 
principal factors are parallel to each other. However, other relationships among these 
principal factors may exist and need to be examined with project data. 
The aim of this chapter is to further examine the underlined causal relationships 
among these 5 principal components, assign the weights to each principal factor, and then 
construct an advanced assessment framework of ABS financing for infrastructure projects 
in practice. The purpose of the assessment framework is to provide a guideline for 
participants in the infrastructure ABS market. Specifically, it can assist project managers 
to assess the potential of financing through ABS, and also provide institutional investors a 
tool to understand the characteristics of an infrastructure ABS product. 
This chapter is organized as follows: first, research methodology is presented, 
including focus group as data collection method and structural equation modeling (SEM) 
as analysis method. Second, SEM analysis is performed and findings are shown 
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accordingly. Finally, an advanced model is proposed for assessing the feasibility of ABS 
financing for PPP infrastructure projects. 
6.1 Research Methodology 
6.1.1 Model for Feasibility Assessment 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) method was used to discover the underlying 
relationships among the 5 principal factors when influencing the overall performance of 
infrastructure ABS financing. SEM was preferred to other methods because of various 
benefits (Singh 2009; Yuan and Hayashi 2010). As a well-established method, SEM is 
recommended for data in social science studies, especially ordinal data from 
questionnaire survey (Yuan and Hayashi 2010). Moreover, the application of SEM for 
research studies in construction related field has been on a growing trend over the years 
(Oke et al. 2012). According to Byrne (2010), SEM has become popular as a 
methodology for non-experimental research (Byrne 2013).  
Since this study is a non-experimental research with ordinal data in construction 
field, SEM is considered suitable to perform the hypothetical testing of the causal 
relationships among principal factors. As all variables are observable, path analysis, a 
special case of SEM, is essentially the method applied in this study. Analysis of moment 
structures (AMOS) software was adopted along with statistical package of social science 
(SPSS) (Oke et al. 2012). Accordingly, the feasibility assessment framework and index 
previously proposed can be improved based on the structure and weights derived from 
SEM analysis.  
6.1.2 Data Collection 
The aim of this study is to explore the causal relationships among the principal 
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assessment factors in affecting the overall feasibility of PPP infrastructure ABS financing. 
Therefore, data should be focusing on existing PPPABS and infrastructure ABS products. 
To achieve reliable results, appropriate sample size is crucial to perform statistical 
techniques such as SEM (Hair et al. 1998). According to Gorsuch (1983)’s 
recommendation, sample size should be at least 5 participants per construct and not less 
than 100 per analysis (Gorsuch 1983). Bagozzi and Yi (2012) also proposed that the 
sample size should be above 100 (Bagozzi and Yi 2012). In this study, according to 
CNABS database, 234 ABS products exist with future receivables as underlined assets 
until the end of 2017. 123 ABS products are based on infrastructure project’s future 
receivables. Consequently, these 123 ABS products are targeted for this study.  
A focus group of experts was conducted to collect rating data for this study. Group 
members are experienced experts from investment banks, rating agencies, and academic 
institutions. All the group members have relative background and participated 
infrastructure ABS issuance and management intensively. This is also a reason that focus 
group meeting is preferred to questionnaire survey, which may not guarantee such direct 
experience (Morgan 1997). Moreover, in this specific scenario, focus group is less time-
consuming on collecting accurate and adequate data than questionnaire survey. 
The focus group meeting is structured to ensure the objective opinion given by the 
experts. First, the purpose of the study is delivered to the focus group, as well as the 
guidelines of rating in general. Then 123 ABS products with infrastructure project’s 
receivables as underlined asset (from 2005 to 2017) were presented to the focus group 
and rated by the experts. 5 point Likert scale was applied when rating. For each ABS 
product, an overall rating was assigned by consensus of the experts, scaling from 1 to 5. 
Furthermore, individual ratings for each principal factor were discussed and given by 
consensus.  
Figure 13 Research Framework
6.2 Causal Relationships among Principal Factors
6.2.1 Feasibility Assessment Model
In order to establish meaningful relationships among factors, careful examination of 
the 5 principal factors is needed. Specifically, issuance and lifetime management of 
PPPABS represent the core financial technique in such a financing mechanism, which 
requires all capital market participants during the ABS lifecycle to be dedicated to 
providing professional, accountable, and sustainable services with their expertise and 
experience. Regulatory guidance defines the general regulations for both PPP and ABS 
industry, especially the new financing instrument from the relevant public authorities. 
PPP and concessional arrangements represent the reasonable contractual framework of 
 
100 





PPP and concession, especially with regards to risk sharing, legal obligation, and 
infrastructure service control. Capital market conditions describe the availability and 
effectiveness of the macro capital market of the host country. Underlying asset quality 
defines the nature of the infrastructure asset and strength of private participants who 
manage the asset. 
Table 49 Principal Factors and Sub-factors 
Principal 





Cash flows management during the lifetime of ABS product 
Stage of the underlying project at issuance and maturity of ABS product 
Bankruptcy remoteness effect due to securitization 
Proper risk reallocation after securitization 
Relief responses when default happens 
Transfer and delivery of underlying asset 
Regulatory 
guidance 
Market access threshold release to more investors 
Relevant tax standards 
Relevant accounting standards 




Reasonable risk allocation and clear responsibilities in PPP arrangement 
Developed legal framework for PPP 
Government’s willingness and capability to support the project and 
fulfill the agreement 
The stability of future cash flows from the PPP project 




Mature and effective capital market 
Active and liquid secondary market 
Objective and accurate credit rating 
Accurate pricing based on market conditions 




Strong private consortium  
Underwriter and trustee’s expertise in infrastructure projects 
Robust overall financial package of the project company 
Receivable of underlying assets (user payment, government payment, 
or viability gap funding) 
Sector of underlying assets (water, power, toll fee, etc.) 
Theoretically, “capital market conditions” and “regulatory guidance” are macro-
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level factors, which shall serve as fundamental factors to influence the overall success of 
PPPABS financing. “Underlying asset quality”, “PPP and concessional arrangements”, 
and “ABS issuance and lifetime management” are micro-level factors which focus on the 
project. Moreover, “capital market conditions” represents the financing environment of 
host country and is likely to affect “ABS issuance and lifetime management” in many 
ways. “Underlying asset quality” is also considered as a fundamental factor at the project 
level. “ABS issuance and lifetime management” is likely to serve as an intermediary 
factor, because it generally occurs during the operation phase of the infrastructure project. 
The role of “PPP and concessional arrangements” needs also to be tested as an 
intermediary factor or antecedent factor. Finally, all variables are observable variables. 
Therefore, “capital market conditions”, “regulatory guidance”, and “Underlying 
asset quality” were chosen as exogenous variables. Exogenous variables are independent 
variables without prior causal variable, although they may be correlated with other 
exogenous variables. “PPP and concessional arrangements”, and “ABS issuance and 
lifetime management” were endogenous variables to be tested. Endogenous variables are 
mediator variables, variables that cause mediation in the dependent and the 
independent variables. 5 hypothetical models as follows were identified for further 
examination.  
6.2.2 Hypothetical Models for SEM 
Model I shows that all 5 principal factors directly affect the overall performance in 
parallel based on the assumption that there are no causal relationships among these 5 
principal factors. It also refers to the idea that “ABS issuance and lifetime management” 
and “PPP and concessional arrangements” are NOT intermediary variables. Instead these 
2 variables act as exogenous variables along wit
overall feasibility of PPPABS
Figure 14 Hypothetical M
Model II assumes that “capital market conditions”, “regulatory guidance”, 
“underlying asset quality” and “PPP and 
variables to “ABS issuance and lifetime management”. And “ABS issuance and lifetime 
management” is assumed to be endogenous variable and directly affects the overall 
feasibility of infrastructure ABS financi
an endogenous variable in this scenario.
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h all the other variables in a
. 
odel I 
concessional arrangements” serve as prior causal 




Figure 15 Hypothetical M
In Model III, “Capital market conditions”, “regulatory guidance”, and “underlying 
asset quality” are exogenou
indirectly. Both “ABS issuance and lifetime management” and “PPP and concessional 
arrangements” are assumed to be endogenous variables between exogenous variables and 
overall feasibility. Specifically, it is assumed that “capital market conditions” and 
“regulatory guidance” are prior causal variables of “ABS issuance and lifetime 
management”, while “regulatory guidance”, and “underlying asset quality” are prior 








Figure 16 Hypothetical M
In Model IV, “Capital market conditions”, “regulatory guidance”, and “underlying 
asset quality” are exogenous variables and thus affect the overall feasibility of 
indirectly. Both “ABS issuance and lifetime management” and “PP
arrangements” are assumed to be endogenous variables between exogenous variables and 
overall feasibility. What makes Model IV different from Model IIII is that “capital market 
conditions” and “underlying asset quality” are prior causal v
and lifetime management”. “Regulatory guidance” and “underlying asset quality” are still 




P and concessional 




Figure 17 Hypothetical M
6.3 Structrual Equation Modeling Analysis
The aim of this section is to test and validate the above
models. The results of the SEM analysis are compared among the hypothetical models. 
By using selection criteria, one model is selected and declared to be superior until a better 
model fit is found (Preacher and Merkle 2012)
the model should be based on the Goodness
should be finally selected if it satisfies both theoretical expectations and appropriate GOF 






. For each hypothetical model, selection of




Figure 18 Hypothetical M
After constructing these 4 hypothetical models in AMOS software
causal relationships among the 5 principal factors are examined. Potential structures were 
tested to derive the best-fit model. 
statistically and is a plausible representation of the causal relationships among the 
assessment factors. More importantly, Models I, II and III should be rejected statistically. 










odels for SEM Analysis 
As Table 2 indicates, Model IV CANNOT be rejected 
s-of-fit (GOF) 





 29.253 12.789 15.9
 0.194 0.664 0.617
 0.481 0.311 0.349
 0.119 0.092 0.055
 0.697 0.76 0.787
 0.199 0.65 0.608
 












RFI >0.9 -0.201 0.475 0.347 0.894 
IFI >0.9 0.205 0.668 0.624 0.96 
TLI(NNFI) >0.9 -0.21 0.495 0.362 0.933 
PNFI >0.5 0.133 0.433 0.365 0.562 
PCFI >0.5 0.129 0.442 0.37 0.576 
Model IV was selected to be further modified to explore the best-fit model. Table 51 
shows that the relationship between ABS and Overall is not significant. Therefore, Model 
IV is modified by removing this relationship to simplify the model. 
Table 51 Regression Weights 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
ABS <--- Asset .585 .040 14.528 *** 
ABS <--- CM .506 .026 19.164 *** 
PPP <--- Regulatory .480 .046 10.383 *** 
PPP <--- Asset -.056 .062 -.901 .368 
Overall <--- ABS .725 .111 6.561 *** 
Overall <--- PPP .714 .125 5.738 *** 
The following figure 18 represents the modified version of Model IV. It means that 
the data indicates that the underlying asset quality influence the overall feasibility 
through ABS issuance and lifetime management instead of PPP and concessional 
arrangements. After reviewing the definition of the variables, this modification is 
considered effective. PPP and concessional arrangements represent reasonable 
contractual framework of PPP and concession. It relies on the professionalism of the 
participants and legal framework rather than the quality of the infrastructure asset. 
Therefore, the modification is kept and SEM analysis is performed to test the result. 
Figure 19 Model IVM 
As Table 52 indicates, Model IV
plausible representation of the causal relationships among the assessment factors.
the GOF measures of Model IVM 













Table 53 shows that the relationships assumed are all significant in this scenario. 
Therefore, Model IVM is kept as the final feasibility assessment model for PPP 




M CANNOT be rejected statistically and is a 



























Table 53 Regression Weights of Model IVM 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
ABS <--- Asset .585 .040 14.528 *** 
ABS <--- CM .506 .026 19.164 *** 
PPP <--- Regulatory .483 .046 10.432 *** 
Overall <--- ABS .725 .110 6.564 *** 
Overall <--- PPP .714 .124 5.762 *** 
 
6.4 Advanced Model  
6.4.1 Advanced Model of Feasibility Assessment 
The causal structure derived from the SEM analysis can help us improve the 
feasibility assessment model proposed earlier in the authors’ previous study. The 5 
principal factors contributed to create an assessment framework for PPPABS financing.  
Specifically, “Capital market conditions”, “underlying asset quality”, and 
“regulatory guidance” are exogenous variables and affect the overall feasibility of 
PPPABS indirectly. Both “ABS issuance and lifetime management” and “PPP and 
concessional arrangements” are endogenous variables between exogenous variables and 
overall feasibility, affecting the overall feasibility directly. “Capital market conditions” 
and “underlying asset quality” are prior causal variables of “ABS issuance and lifetime 
management”. And “Regulatory guidance” is prior causal variable of “PPP and 
concessional arrangements” 
Figure 20 Final Model of Feasibility Assessment
The feasibility index previously proposed can also be improved as follows for 
overall assessment and decision making with the causal relationships embedded. The 
coefficients allocated to components are derived from the SEM analysis (Table 
Table 54 Standardized Regression of Model IVM
   
ABS <--- Asset 
ABS <--- CM 
PPP <--- Regulatory
Overall <--- ABS 
Overall <--- PPP 
Feasibility index = 0.466
ABS = 0.549 ∗ Asset + 0
PPP = 0.687 ∗ Regulatory











∗ ABS + 0.409 ∗ PPP 
.724 ∗ CM 
 





ABS: Rating for Effective ABS issuance and lifetime management 
Regulatory: Rating for Clear regulatory guidance 
PPP: Rating for Robust PPP and concessional arrangements 
CM: Rating for Supportive capital market conditions 
Asset: Rating for Reliable underlying asset quality 
In practice, project managers are able to use this feasibility assessment model for an 
instant evaluation on whether or not to finance with PPPABS. For example, the project 
manager gives sub-ratings (scale from 1 to 5) based on the 5 principal dimensions. Then 
an overall model rating can be easily calculated using the equation above. This feasibility 
rating score can be compared with benchmark rating scores in the industry, which gives a 
hint of feasibility. 
6.4.2 Framework Application and Validation 
The first batch of PPPABS screenings is used again to validate the advanced model. 
The result of agreement analysis shows in Table 55. The PA between the experts’ decision 
and the model’s decision is 77%. It means that experts’ intuitive assessment of the 
projects has 77% overlap with assessment and recommendation by the proposed model. 
This result also outperformed the previous assessment model proposed by the authors, 
which proves that this new model based on SEM analysis is more robust. 
Table 55 Agreement Analysis 
RAF 𝑅𝐴𝐹௠௔௫ PD PA 
4.78 20.49 23% 77% 
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Table 56 Model Validation 
Project Sub-rating Overall rating Rank 
# Regulatory PPP CM Asset ABS Expert Index Expert Model Diff 
1 4 4 3 5 4 4 3.42 5 10 5 
2 4 3 3 3 4 3 2.90 13 24 11 
3 4 3 2 2 4 2 2.31 29 38 9 
4 4 5 4 5 5 5 3.75 1 4 3 
5 4 3 3 3 3 2 2.90 29 24 5 
6 4 3 3 3 3 2 2.90 29 24 5 
7 4 4 3 3 4 3 2.90 13 24 11 
8 3 2 2 3 2 1 2.29 38 40 2 
9 3 2 2 3 2 1 2.29 38 40 2 
10 4 3 4 3 4 3 3.24 13 13 0 
11 4 3 3 4 3 3 3.16 13 19 6 
12 4 5 4 5 5 5 3.75 1 4 3 
13 3 3 4 4 3 3 3.22 13 15 2 
14 3 3 4 4 4 3 3.22 13 15 2 
15 3 3 4 3 4 3 2.96 13 22 9 
16 4 4 3 3 4 3 2.90 13 24 11 
17 4 4 5 5 5 5 4.09 1 1 0 
18 4 3 3 3 4 3 2.90 13 24 11 
19 3 2 3 3 3 2 2.62 29 35 6 
20 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.50 5 8 3 
21 3 2 4 4 2 3 3.22 13 15 2 
22 4 2 3 4 2 3 3.16 13 19 6 
23 4 4 4 3 4 4 3.24 5 13 8 
24 4 4 4 5 4 4 3.75 5 4 1 
25 4 5 4 4 4 4 3.50 5 8 3 
26 4 4 5 5 5 5 4.09 1 1 0 
27 4 5 4 5 4 4 3.75 5 4 1 
28 3 2 3 3 2 1 2.62 38 35 3 
29 4 4 3 4 3 3 3.16 13 19 6 
30 3 2 4 3 2 2 2.96 29 22 7 
31 4 4 5 4 4 4 3.83 5 3 2 
32 4 4 3 5 4 3 3.42 13 10 3 
33 4 5 3 5 4 4 3.42 5 10 5 
34 4 3 3 3 3 3 2.90 13 24 11 
35 3 3 4 4 2 3 3.22 13 15 2 
36 4 3 3 3 4 3 2.90 13 24 11 
37 4 3 3 2 2 2 2.65 29 32 3 
38 3 3 3 2 2 1 2.37 38 37 1 
39 4 4 3 2 3 2 2.65 29 32 3 
40 4 3 3 2 2 2 2.65 29 32 3 
41 4 3 2 2 3 2 2.31 29 38 9 
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN: Pricing Determinants for PPPABS at Launch 
Reasonable pricing of spread is essential for project owners to make decisions when 
estimating the financing cost of PPPABS. According to the questionnaire survey in the 
empirical study, accurate pricing based on market conditions is rated to be important by 
the respondents, with an average rating of 4.3 out of 5. Hence it is crucial to understand 
what sub-factors drive the pricing of PPPABS product at launch. 
This chapter focuses on this issue and shows as an instance of how to expand the 
assessment framework with detailed sub-factors in the future. A multiple regression 
model is derived to identify the pricing determinants of PPP infrastructure ABS products 
at launch. Public data from the ABS market in China is collected. Multiple linear 
regression analysis is applied to analyze the data.  
7.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is widely used for the pricing of risky securities, 
generating expected returns for assets, and calculating cost of capital (Investopedia 2018). 
It usually describes the relationships between expected return of a financial product and 
the underlined risks. Therefore, CAPM is adopted to formulate the pricing model for 
PPPABS product. 
The return of PPPABS product is decided by multiple risks embedded, which in turn 
provide premiums accordingly. Typical risks of a structured ABS product include default 
risk, liquidity risk, interest risk, and prepayment risk. Regarding infrastructure project 
finance loans, default risk is identified as a key determinant (Kleimeier and Megginson 
2000). Credit risk premium has also been studied for infrastructure projects in developing 
 115 
countries (Dailami and Leipziger 1998). In addition, the nature of underlined asset and 
project specific characteristics are critical for debt financing for PPP projects (Blanc‐
Brude and Strange 2007). The price determinants of structured finance issues backed by 
project finance loans have been studied and examined to include factors such as market 
liquidity and maturity (Buscaino et al. 2012).  
A previously published paper of the author has identified credit rating, maturity 
period, size and the year of issuance as basic determinants of PPPABS pricing (Chu et al. 
2017). In this chapter, modified pricing model will be explored based on this work. And 
additional pricing determinants will be examined. 
7.2 Regression Analysis to Investigate Pricing Determinants 
7.2.1 Basic Pricing Model2 
According to the previously published paper, multiple regression analysis is adopted 
to explore the pricing determinants for PPP infrastructure ABS at launch. The pricing data 
of PPP infrastructure ABS products from January 2014 to March 2017 is collected.  
Dependent variable in this regression model is the spread between infrastructure abs 
interest rate and the benchmark interest rate. Treasury bond interest rate with the same 
maturity is adopted as the benchmark to calculate the spread. 
Independent variables include industry, year of issuance, size of issuance, credit 
rating of ABS product, and maturity of the security. The results show that the credit rating 
of the securities, the size, the maturity period and the year of issue have a significant 
impact on the spread; the return risk of infrastructure projects will also have a significant 
                                                 
2 This section refers to a paper co-authored with Xiaoling Chu, Ting Liu, S.Q. Wang, and Di Wu. It was published 
in the journal of Sub National Fiscal Research 2017(in Chinese). 
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impact on the spread of PPP-ABS, with an adjusted R-square of 53.3% (Chu et al. 2017).  
7.2.2 Modified Pricing Model 
The success of a PPP project highly relies on the cooperation between the public 
sector and private sector. Accordingly, the quality of the public sector should also be 
considered in the pricing process of the ABS product. Therefore, to achieve a more robust 
pricing model, a potential way of modification is to incorporate the local economic 
conditions and credit record of the local public partner. Specifically, the local economic 
(GDP) growth rate is used to represent the economic condition, while the credit rating of 
local government is used to represent credit record of the local public partner. The 
modified model becomes the one as follows. 
Data source of the additional variables are Wind database and credit reports from 
rating agencies. The data of original variables of the model are mainly from CNABS 
database, which focus on the ABS market and provide detailed ABS product information. 
In addition to that, Wind database and credit reports also serve as complementary sources 
to acquire information needed. 
Table 57 Definition of Variables 
Variables Variable type Description Source 
Spread Dependent variable 
Spread over treasury bond with 
same maturity in China 
(CNABS 2017) 
(Wind 2017) 
Issue Control variable The issue size of the ABS product (CNABS 2017) 
Maturity Control variable Maturity of the ABS product (CNABS 2017) 
Credit_rating Control variable Credit rating of the ABS product 
(CNABS 2017) 
Credit reports 
Year Control variable Year of issuance (CNABS 2017) 
Growth Control Local economic growth (Wind 2017) 
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variable 
Public_rating Control variable 




Spread = a଴ + βଵ ∗ Issue + βଶ ∗ Maturity + βଷ ∗ Credit_rating + βସ ∗ Year + βହ
∗ Growth + β଺ ∗ Public_rating + ε 
7.3 Fiancial Cost Estimation Model 
According to the result of analysis, the size of issuance, the maturity period, the 
credit rating of the securities, the year of issuance, the local economic growth, and the 
credit rating of local government have a significant impact on the pricing spread of 
PPPABS financing. In addition, the new model’s adjusted R-square is improved to be 
63.3%. 
Table 58 Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .807 .651 .633 .51704812 
Furthermore, Table 59 shows the coefficients as well as the significant level of the 
variables. All independent variables are significant affecting the dependent variable. 
Therefore, additional variables of local economic conditions and credit record of the local 
public partner improve the pricing model and will be kept. 
Issue size has a significant and negative coefficient. This result can be interpreted in 
two ways. Larger issue size of the ABS product provides better liquidity to the market, 
which lower the liquidity risk premium required by the investors. Moreover, larger issue 
size implies a stronger issuer. A strong issuer usually has better credit record and thus 
deserves lower financing cost. 
Maturity has a significant and positive coefficient, validating that longer maturity 
theoretically has positive correlation with pricing. This is mainly because the investors 
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require to be compensated due to the lack of liquidity of the long-term securities. 
ABS credit rating has a significant and negative coefficient, indicating that higher 
credit rating with lower credit risk will lower the cost of ABS financing. In general, the 
credit rating of ABS product provides an overall examination of underlying asset quality, 
cash flow forecast, credit enhancement, ABS deal structure, risk and sensitivity, and 
quality of the issuer. This variable is a major contributor to the explanation of the 
dependent variable. 
Year of issuance has a significant and negative coefficient, which represent macro-
economic situations while issuing the ABS. It is assumed that year of issuance can be 
used to approximately represent the interest rate risk, macro-economic environment, 
money supply. 
Local economic growth has a significant and negative coefficient. That is to say, 
higher GDP growth means healthy fiscal conditions and local economic environment. 
Healthy fiscal condition is able to give more confidence to the private sector in terms of 
receiving payment or subsidies by the public counterparty. This result proves the 
assumption that the quality of the public sector is considered important in the pricing 
process of PPPABS. 
Credit rating of public sector partner has a significant and negative coefficient. It can 
be concluded that higher credit rating of the public sector counterparty indicates lower 
credit risk from the public partners, which leads to lower ABS financing cost. This further 
validates that the quality of the public counterparty should be considered as one of the 
pricing determinants. 






Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 7.008 .456  15.384 .000 
Issue -.065 .031 -.142 -2.081 .040 
Maturity .188 .027 .398 6.833 .000 
Credit_rating -.745 .131 -.438 -5.707 .000 
Year -.439 .065 -.425 -6.786 .000 
Growth -9.342 3.863 -.174 -2.418 .017 
Public_rating -.259 .086 -.222 -3.001 .003 
Given the variables and coefficients, an estimation model for financial cost of 
PPPABS financing can be constructed as follows. It is also included in the feasibility 
assessment framework of PPPABS financing, so that practitioners who use the 
framework as a guideline, both the project managers and institutional investors, can 
approximately estimate the pricing of the PPPABS product.  
Spread = 7.008 − 0.065 ∗ Issue + 0.188 ∗ Maturity − 0.745 ∗ Credit_rating − 0.439
∗ Year − 9.342 ∗ Growth − 0.259 ∗ Public_rating 
The aim of this chapter is to explore one of the CSFs of PPPABS financing, accurate 
pricing based on market conditions. The pricing model shows that the size of issuance, 
the maturity period, the credit rating of the securities, the year of issuance, the local 
economic growth, and the credit rating of local government affect the pricing spread of 
PPPABS financing significantly.  
These findings expand this accurate pricing factor of PPPABS and provide an 
estimation model for financial cost of PPPABS financing. In practice, this pricing model 




8 CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion and Future Study 
Effective assessment of the feasibility of financing infrastructure project through 
ABS is critical for both project managers and institutional investors. This thesis presents 
an assessment framework for applying PPPABS financing method by collecting and 
analyzing opinions from both conventional PPP related industries and the capital market. 
Through a careful literature review, a detailed case study, and expert interviews, 25 
critical factors of successful financing are generated to be further examined with a 
questionnaire survey. 5 principal components are extracted through factor analysis, 
including “Effective ABS issuance and lifetime management”, “Clear regulatory 
guidance”, “Robust PPP and concessional arrangements”, “Supportive capital market 
conditions”, and “Reliable underlying asset quality”.  
Issuance and lifetime management of PPPABS represent the core financial technique 
in such a financing mechanism, which requires all capital market participants during the 
ABS lifecycle to be dedicated to providing professional, accountable, and sustainable 
services with their expertise and experience. Regulatory guidance defines the general 
regulations for both PPP and ABS industry, especially the new financing instrument from 
the relevant public authorities. PPP and concessional arrangements represent the 
reasonable contractual framework of PPP and concession, especially regarding risk 
sharing, legal obligation, and infrastructure service control. Capital market conditions 
describe the availability and effectiveness of the macro capital market of the host country. 
Underlying asset quality defines the nature of the infrastructure asset and strength of 
private participants who manage the asset. Based on the 5 components model, a 
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feasibility index has already been constructed for overall assessment and decision making 
when considering PPPABS financing instrument.  
In addition, the causal relationships underlined these critical factors is investigated 
by applying SEM analysis. Findings from SEM analysis contain that “capital market 
conditions”, “underlying asset quality”, and “regulatory guidance” are exogenous 
variables and affect the overall feasibility of PPPABS indirectly. Both “ABS issuance and 
lifetime management” and “PPP and concessional arrangements” are endogenous 
variables between exogenous variables and overall feasibility, affecting the overall 
feasibility directly. “Capital market conditions” and “underlying asset quality” influence 
“ABS issuance and lifetime management” as prior causal variables, while “Regulatory 
guidance” affects “PPP and concessional arrangements” as prior causal variable. All of 
the causal relationships are examined with the rating data of 123 PPP infrastructure ABS 
products and proved to be significant. 
Proper assessment of PPPABS financing will contribute notably to project success 
by taking advantages of such financing innovation, especially compared to conventional 
financing methods. It is therefore necessary for concerned practitioners to pay more 
attention to methodology of assessment. Based on the principal factors and causal 
relationships, an advanced assessment model and index were constructed to serve as a 
tool for the task. Practitioners in the industry may apply this framework for evaluation on 
the feasibility of PPPABS financing. It will aid the decision-making process for not only 
the project participants who consider financing infrastructure projects through ABS, but 
also the institutional investors who consider investment in PPP infrastructure ABS. 
Finally, the framework and index can serve as a guide to practitioners who consider 
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PPPABS as an alternative infrastructure financing method. 
As the expansion work for the pricing factor in chapter seven, more in-depth work 
could be done in the future for each individual CSFs and principal components. By 
expanding the CSFs, the feasibility assessment framework could become more 
comprehensive for the practitioners in the industry who are considering ABS financing 
for PPP projects. Besides, application of PPPABS in other countries could be interesting, 
especially countries with different jurisdiction. Plenty of work could be done in this field 
to examine the potential of applying PPPABS in other developing countries. Nevertheless, 
developed countries with plenty of mature operational assets, such as Canada and some 
European countries, are also likely to adopt PPPABS as alternative refinancing 
instrument. Lastly, this framework can be also helpful if there are slight variations of 
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APPENDIX I: Questionnaire (English) 
PPP Asset Securitization Survey 
Dear colleagues, 
 
It is a great honor to invite you to the joint study between Civil Engineering Department 
of Columbia University and Tsinghua University. 
 
In recent years, Public-Private Partnership (PPP) has been widely studied and applied in 
China. To attract more private investment in PPP, recycle existing financing sources, and 
encourage financial innovation, National Development and Reform Commission as well 
as China Securities Regulatory Commission jointly issued “The Notice on Tasks Relating 
to the Promotion of Asset Securitization for PPP Projects in the Traditional Infrastructure 
Sector” (Document No. 2698). This move has caused widespread attention in both PPP 
industry and capital market in China.  
 
The purpose of this study is to build up an assessment framework of PPPABS by 
evaluating the following issues of PPP asset securitization financing: 1. Benefits and 
challenges; 2. Critical success factors; 3. Suitable projects and investors; 4. Risk 
premiums. 
 
We assure you that this survey information is for academic research only, and your 
personal information will never be disclosed. Please submit before March 15, 2017. 






1. PPPABS’s benefits 
Not significant 1--->5 Very significant 
 1 2 3 4 5 
For ABS issuer      
Provide new financing method to the project company ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Provide liquidity to PPP investment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Provide exit opportunity to the investors ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Investors from the capital market help share some risk of PPP project ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Off-the-balance sheet financing opportunity ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Sponsor can take advantage of credit enhancement arrangements to reduce 
financing costs ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
For ABS investor      
Provide an alternative investment for diversification ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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Provide long-term oriented institutional investors with long-term infrastructure 
assets ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Provide indirect PPP investment opportunity to individual investors ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Legal arrangement of SPV provide bankruptcy remoteness from the issuer ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Transparent information disclosure due to the capital market requirement ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
   Other____________ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
2. PPPABS’s challenges 
Not significant 1--->5 Very significant 
 1 2 3 4 5 
For ABS Issuer      
Complex legal and contractual preparation ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
High transactional cost ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Lower power of credit enhancement as government is currently not allowed to 
secure the revenue for PPP projects ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Complexity and uncertainty due to public participation in company issues ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
O&M service of PPP project is not guaranteed during the lifetime of entire ABS 
product ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Both current PPP and ABS regulatory guidance are not refined enough ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
For ABS investors:      
As the franchise is difficult to transfer to the SPV under current relative law, it 
is difficult to achieve complete bankruptcy remoteness. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Currently trading is not active in secondary market. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Systematic risk due to potential abuse of derivatives in the future ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Asymmetric information between the sponsor and the ABS investors ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
The interests of individual investors are not easy to protect. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
The close relationship between the PPP investor and the project company may 
result in a risk of cash flow mixing and liquidity shortfall. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Other____________ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
3. Please rate the following critical success factors of PPPABS  
Not important 1--->5 Very important 
Status quo in China：not satisfied 1’--->5’ very satisfied 
 1 2 3 4 5 1' 2' 3' 4' 5' 
Developed legal framework for PPP □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Clear regulatory body and coordination mechanism for such financial 
instrument □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Open and transparent approval process and information disclosure □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Relevant tax standards □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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Relevant accounting standards □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Other____________ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
4. Please rate the following critical success factors of PPPABS  
Not important 1--->5 Very important 
Status quo in China：not satisfied 1’--->5’ very satisfied 
 1 2 3 4 5 1' 2' 3' 4' 5' 
Mature and effective capital market □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Objective and accurate credit rating □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Accurate pricing based on market conditions □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Active and liquid secondary market □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Market access threshold release to more investors □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Other____________ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
5. Please rate the following critical success factors of PPPABS  
Not important 1--->5 Very important 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Receivable of underlined assets (user payment, government payment, or 
viability gap funding) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Sector of underlined assets (water, power, toll fee, etc.) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Strong private consortium ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
The stability of future cash flows from the PPP project ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Robust financial package of project company ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Reasonable risk allocation and clear responsibilities in PPP arrangement ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Government’s willingness and capability to support the project and fulfill the 
agreement ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Reliable PPP Infrastructure service ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Other____________ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
6. Please rate the following critical success factors of PPPABS  
Not important 1--->5 Very important 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Stage of underlined project at issuance and maturity of ABS product ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Proper risk reallocation after securitization ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Bankruptcy remoteness effect due to securitization ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Underwriter and trustee’s expertise in infrastructure ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Cash flows management during lifetime of ABS product ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Relief responses when default happens ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Transfer and delivery of underlined asset ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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Other____________ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
7. Please rate the following risk premium of PPPABS 
Not important 1--->5 Very important 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Default risk premium ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Nature of underlined asset risk premium ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Liquidity risk premium ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Interest risk premium ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Prepayment risk premium ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Other____________ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
8. Please rate the following types of PPP project’ suitability to be financed with PPPABS  
Not suitable 1--->5 very suitable 
 1 2 3 4 5 
User payment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Viability gap funding ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Government payment ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
9. Please rate the following institutional investors’ suitability of investing PPPABS 
product 
Not suitable 1--->5 very suitable 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Commercial Banks ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Insurance companies ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Pension funds ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Proprietary trading of Investment Banks ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Trust companies ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Finance/Investment business of corporations ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Mutual funds ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Hedge funds ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
10. Your occupation： 
   □ Government employee 
   □ Investor 
   □ Financial institution professional 
   □ Designer/Engineer/Contractor 
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   □ Consultant/Lawyer/Accountant 
   □ Academic researcher 
   □ Other _________________ 
 
11. Your working experience： 
   ○ less than 5 years    ○ 5~10 years    ○ 10 years and above  
 
 
12. Your PPP/Infrastructure related experience： 
   ○ less than 5 years    ○ 5~10 years    ○ 10 years and above  
 
 
13. Your ABS related experience： 
   ○ less than 5 years    ○ 5~10 years    ○ 10 years and above  
 
 














PPP 项目资产证券化，在 PPP 的各参与方和资产证券化的相关机构中引起了广泛的
关注。 










1. PPP 项目资产证券化的优势 
该优势：非常不显著 1--->5 非常显著 [矩阵量表题] 
 1 2 3 4 5 
为项目公司提供新的融资渠道 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
为 PPP 投资提供二级市场流动性 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
为 PPP 投资者和债权人提供退出途径 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
资本市场广大投资者参与可以帮助分担 PPP 项目风险 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
提供资产负债表外融资的机会 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
融资主体可充分利用信用増级手段降低融资成本 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
为投资者分散化投资提供一种另类投资工具 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
为具有长期投资策略的机构投资者（保险公司、养老金等）提供同样着眼
于长期投资运营的基础设施类资产 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
未来可以通过证券化为广大个人投资者提供 PPP 项目的投资机会 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
证券化 SPV 结构可提供有效的风险隔离 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
由于证券上市使得项目信息更加公开透明 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




2. PPP 项目资产证券化面临的的阻碍 
该阻碍：非常不显著 1--->5 非常显著 [矩阵量表题] 
 1 2 3 4 5 
复杂的法律框架、合同及交易结构 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
额外的交易成本 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
由于 PPP 项目中政府不能进行刚性兑付，增信力度相较传统基础设施
收费收益权资产证券化略弱 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
由于 PPP 项目中政府也是股东，增加了复杂性和不确定性 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
特许经营权难以转让给资产证券化 SPV，难以实现完全的破产隔离 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
二级市场交易机制不够完善，交易不够活跃 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
未来证券化衍生产品不易控制，容易引发系统性风险 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
原始权益人与资本市场投资者之间的信息不对称（或有欺诈行为） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
通过如理财产品变相介入的个人投资者利益不易保障 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
存续期间基础设施资产的运营维护质量不易保障 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
原始权益人与基础资产的紧密联系容易造成资金混同风险和流动性风
险 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
PPP 和资产证券化顶层设计还不够完善和细化 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
其他____________ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
3. PPP 项目资产证券化关键成功因素分析——监管层面 
该条款：非常不重要 1--->5 非常重要 
中国的现状：非常不完善 1’--->5’非常完善 [矩阵多选题] 
 1 2 3 4 5 1' 2' 3' 4' 5' 
相关法律法规的完善 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
明晰的监管主体和协调机制 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
公开透明的信息披露 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
相关税务准则的完善 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
相关财会处理的完善 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
其他____________ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
4. PPP 项目资产证券化关键成功因素分析——市场层面 
该条款：非常不重要 1--->5 非常重要 
中国的现状：非常不完善 1’--->5’非常完善 [矩阵多选题] 
 1 2 3 4 5 1' 2' 3' 4' 5' 
成熟、有效的证券市场 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
信用评级的客观、准确性 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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市场参与者对证券化产品定价准确地把握 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
活跃的二级市场 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
投资者市场准入门槛的放开 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
其他____________ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
5. PPP 项目资产证券化关键成功因素分析——产品层面——PPP 项目 
该条款：非常不重要 1--->5 非常重要 [矩阵量表题] 
 1 2 3 4 5 
基础资产性质（收费收益权、财政补贴、混合、资产池） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
基础资产类别（水、电、收费公路等） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
原始权益人对基础资产的运营管理水平 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
基础资产未来现金流的稳定性 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
股权结构的合理性 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
PPP 项目收益和风险分担的合理性 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
政府的履约能力和意愿 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
存续期间项目运营维护质量的保障 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
其他____________ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
6. PPP 项目资产证券化关键成功因素分析——产品层面——证券化 
该条款：非常不重要 1--->5 非常重要 [矩阵量表题] 
 1 2 3 4 5 
证券化发起阶段和期限的选择 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
证券化过程中风险的再分配是否得当 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
证券化过程中风险隔离 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
管理人对项目的主动管理能力 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
存续期现金流的归集和划拨 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
明确违约发生时的应对和救济渠道 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
完善的资产转移、交付流程 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
其他____________ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
7. PPP 证券化产品定价的风险要素构成 
该条款：非常不重要 1--->5 非常重要 [矩阵量表题] 
 1 2 3 4 5 
违约风险(主要指证券化参与主体对它们所承诺的各种合约的违约造




定性导致产品现金流风险。) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
流动性风险(定价应对是否需要挂牌交易以及二级市场交易的活跃程
度进行补偿。) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
利率风险(指债券价格受利率波动发生逆向变动而造成的风险。) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
提前还款风险(指由于发行主体提前还款导致投资者面临的再投资风
险补偿。) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
其他____________ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
8. 适合证券化的 PPP 基础资产类型 [矩阵量表题] [必答题] 
 1 2 3 4 5 
完全由使用者付费模式下的收费收益权 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
可行性缺口模式下的收费收益权和财政补贴 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
完全由政府付费模式下的财政补贴 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 
9. 适合投资 PPP 证券化产品的机构投资者 
该条款：非常不适合 1--->5 非常适合 [矩阵量表题] [必答题] 
 1 2 3 4 5 
银行 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
保险公司 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
社保基金、养老金 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
证券公司自营业务 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
信托 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
大型企业财务、投资公司 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
公募基金 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
私募基金 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
 







□ 其他 _________________ 
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11. 工作经验： [单选题] [必答题] 
○ 5 年以下    ○ 5~10 年    ○ 10 年以上  
 
 
12. PPP 相关经验： [单选题] [必答题] 
○ 5 年以下    ○ 5~10 年    ○ 10 年以上  
 
 
13. 资产证券化相关经验： [单选题] [必答题] 
○ 5 年以下    ○ 5~10 年    ○ 10 年以上  
 
 
问卷结束 
